Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress in the Structural Constitution by Rao, Neomi
Florida Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 1 Article 1
Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress
in the Structural Constitution
Neomi Rao
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neomi Rao, Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress in the Structural Constitution, 70 Fla. L. Rev. 1 ().
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss1/1
1




Congress currently operates in the shadow of the administrative state. 
This Article provides a modern reconsideration of why Congress still 
matters by examining the “collective Congress” within the text, structure, 
and history of the Constitution. Like the unitary executive, the collective 
Congress is a structural feature of the Constitution’s separation of 
powers. With deep roots in political theory, the Framers created a 
representative and collective legislature that would provide a legitimate 
mechanism for bringing together the nation’s diverse interests to most 
effectively pursue the common good. To fully realize the benefits of 
collective lawmaking, the Constitution insists on the double exclusivity 
of the legislative power: only Congress can exercise legislative power,
and Congress possesses only legislative power. The Constitution ties the 
ambitions of representatives and senators to Congress as an institution 
by prohibiting members of Congress from exercising the executive or 
judicial powers. This structure supports the members’ fiduciary 
responsibilities to the people, minimizes corruption, and reinforces the 
independence and integrity of the lawmaking power. 
Understanding the principles of a collective Congress provides a 
framework for analyzing a range of separation of powers questions, 
particularly those arising from the delegation of legislative power to 
administrative agencies. Quite simply, presidential control of 
administration cannot replace congressional control of legislation. 
Congress remains relevant in our complex modern society because it 
provides a unique form of accountability for ascertaining and pursuing 
the public good, preserving the rule of law, and protecting individual 
liberty. The collective Congress provides a powerful conceptual 
framework for understanding the scope of the Constitution’s “legislative 
power” and how Congress may exercise it. The administrative state blurs 
the line between the executive and legislative powers. The collective 
Congress sharpens that line and helps explain why Congress still matters 
in our system of government.
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INTRODUCTION
The principle of political life lies in the sovereign 
authority. The legislative power is the heart of the State; the
executive power is its brain . . . . A man can remain an 
imbecile and live. But as soon as the heart has ceased to
function, the animal is dead.1
The modern administrative state has marginalized Congress—or 
perhaps more accurately, by creating the modern administrative state, 
Congress has marginalized itself. The Constitution vests all legislative 
power in Congress,2 but congressional lawmaking is now often the 
exception, rather than the rule. Commentators have deemed the 
constitutional framework a “relic.”3 Progressive era ideals of expertise 
and impatience with slow legislative processes have become firmly 
entrenched in the federal government, which acts primarily through 
administration. Congress is beset by polarization, gridlock, and weakness
relative to the President. The executive branch has been declared the 
necessary victor in the separation of powers battles.
This Article aims to reveal—or perhaps more accurately, to revive—
the reasons for vesting the legislative power in a Congress with specific 
institutional characteristics, namely collective decisionmaking and 
exclusion from the executive and judicial powers. The sidelining of 
Congress and dismissal of its importance in our complex society make it 
essential to reconsider the centrality of legislative power in the creation 
and maintenance of a republican form of government, the preservation 
of the rule of law, and the protection of individual liberty. 
Revisiting the importance of Congress raises a challenge to the
familiar themes that legislation and regulation are functionally 
interchangeable and that the efficiency and expertise of agencies 
outweigh the benefits of lawmaking by Congress.4 Regulation looks like 
                                                                                                                     
1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 99 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith 
R. Masters trans., 1978).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. See generally WILLIAM G. HOWELL & TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION 
UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND WHY WE NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY 
(2016) (arguing that Congress lacks effectiveness because the Constitution was flawed in its 
design).
4. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23 (2016) (“The very institutions of the original Constitution, functioning 
as they were originally created to function, decided for excellent reasons (from a lawyer’s point 
of view) to create the administrative state and to abnegate authority to it.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (2016) (“[T]he informational 
advantages of the executive branch are an essential part of thinking about the contemporary 
system of checks and balances. These advantages were not clearly visible until relatively recently, 
and they bear directly on a wide range of questions involving the allocation of authority.”).
3
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the law, walks like the law, and sounds like the law because it has the 
force of law. The dominance of regulation and administrative law has
blurred the importance of lawmaking by Congress and the purpose of 
formulating and enacting society’s rules in a representative legislature. 
The gradual displacement of legislation with regulation originated in 
the early twentieth century with the progressives, who frankly advocated 
supplanting the original constitutional design.5 Yet contemporary 
scholarship has sought to accommodate the significant shift of 
lawmaking to agencies within the constitutional framework, to find 
proxies for traditional constitutional values, to justify and to harmonize 
administrative decisionmaking, and to promote accountability and 
restraint. We have in effect what some scholars have termed an 
administrative constitution, a parallel system of checks and balances for 
the fourth branch.6
Congress currently stands in the shadow of the administrative state. 
Yet administrative ascendance is not part of the inexorable march of 
                                                                                                                     
5. See, e.g., FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW, The American Conception of Liberty, in THE 
AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT 7, 21 (1916) (arguing against the theories 
of individual liberalism from the eighteenth century that animated the Constitution). Goodnow 
notes that “while insistence on individual rights may have been of great advantage at a time when 
the social organization was not highly developed, it may become a menace when social rather 
than individual efficiency is the necessary prerequisite of progress.” Id.; WOODROW WILSON,
What Is Progress?, in THE NEW FREEDOM 33, 48 (1913) (“All that progressives ask or desire is 
permission—in an era when ‘development’ ‘evolution,’ is the scientific word—to interpret the 
Constitution according to the Darwinian principle; all they ask is recognition of the fact that a 
nation is a living thing and not a machine.”).
6. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing that regulatory devices should be used to 
secure rights beyond those required by the Constitution); Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten 
Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1221 (2014) (“The statutes, judicial decisions, 
and executive directives that perform [constitutional] functions make up an unwritten constitution 
that governs the fourth branch of government not contemplated by the written Constitution. . . . 
[T]hey provide an essential legal and theoretical foundation for extending fundamental 
constitutional principles to administrative agencies.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
462–63 (2003) (discussing attempts to reconcile administration with the constitutional structure 
and arguing for an increased focus on arbitrariness in administrative decisionmaking); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1903 (2013) (describing the 
varieties of administrative constitutionalism); Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in 
Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 927 (2016) (noting with concern that agencies have moved 
away from the administrative constitution and considering how evolution of the administrative 
constitution can be legitimate). The legitimacy of these alternative checks and balances have 
provoked vigorous academic debate. Compare Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The 
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017) (critiquing political, judicial, and 
academic pushback against the administrative constitution), with Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions 
of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2017) (responding to Professor Metzger).  
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss1/1
2018] WHY CONGRESS MATTERS 5
reason, and presidential control of administration7 should not replace 
congressional control of legislation. Other scholars, particularly Philip 
Hamburger, have provided a trenchant critique of the unlawfulness of 
administrative action that shifts legislative power to the executive.8 This
Article shares some of the same conclusions, but it also offers a positive 
argument for the representative and collective Congress vested with the 
legislative power by our Constitution. Building on earlier scholarship, I 
identify the structure and values of the “collective Congress”9 as part of 
a project of rethinking Congress and its importance in our form of 
constitutional government. 
This Article will identify and analyze the meaning of “legislative 
power” by examining the collective Congress in the text, structure, and 
history of the Constitution. Part I begins by identifying several important 
principles regarding legislative power found in the political philosophy 
familiar to the Framers. It considers the centrality of collective legislative 
power to the creation of government and the relationship between 
collective lawmaking and promoting the general good. The Framers 
wrestled with how to relate the parts to the whole—how representative 
government could act for all the people. They ultimately concluded that
the deliberation, negotiation, and compromise necessary to produce 
legislation would best serve the interests of each individual. Collective 
lawmaking would also enforce a certain type of legislative impartiality
and the rule of law. These principles run through the Framers’ 
understanding of the legislative power as essential for promoting the 
                                                                                                                     
7. Presidential accountability and control of agencies have been a favored tool for 
improving the accountability and effectiveness of administration. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi 
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 664
n.563 (1994) (arguing that presidential superintendence of the laws “promote[s] an energetic and 
accountable administration”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2331–32 (2001) (arguing that the President’s directive authority advances accountability, 
effectiveness, transparency, and responsiveness). 
8. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 81–82 (2014)
(“Administrative law thereby restores the full range of extralegal powers concerning legislation—
powers that constitutional law was designed to defeat. . . . The peril of administrative power, 
however, lies not in its potential for good, but in its potential for danger by unraveling government 
through law.”); see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“The actual structure and operation of the national government today 
has virtually nothing to do with the Constitution.”). Jeremy Waldron offers a more positive 
account of the “dignity of legislation” in comparison to other forms of executive or judicial 
lawmaking. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 354 
(2009). Waldron explains the distinctive features of a legislature and advocates a “well-thought-
through ideal which we can use to hold up [our legislative institutions] for comparison.” Id.
9. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective 
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1491 (2015) (introducing the concept of the collective 
Congress in the context of examining the problem of delegation).
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general good and explain the Constitution’s innovation to vest the 
legislative power exclusively with Congress.
Part II identifies and develops the principle of the collective Congress 
within the text of the Constitution. This textualist and “intratextualist”10
approach identifies relationships between the parts of Congress and the 
whole and reinforces the importance of generality in the law. The 
Constitution creates a double exclusivity of legislative power—only 
Congress can exercise legislative power and Congress possesses only 
legislative power. The Constitution’s limits on Congress bolster 
legislation for the general good and frustrate factional interests. The 
collective Congress expresses an important separation of powers 
principle.
Part III analyzes the components of Congress and how the powers and 
limitations of the two branches and of individual members reinforce the 
importance of collective lawmaking. Both Congress as an institution and 
its members as individuals have only legislative powers. This parallel 
structure reinforces the collective Congress and the exclusivity of 
legislative power. The internal structure of Congress promotes the values 
of collective decisionmaking, such as the minimization of factional 
influence, the fiduciary duty of members to the people, and the enactment 
of laws that promote the general good.
The collective Congress within the constitutional structure will be 
taken up in Part IV. The Constitution deliberately vests the powers of the 
federal government in departments with specific characteristics in part 
“to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each 
may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual 
may be a centinel over the public rights.”11 The collective Congress 
delineates the scope and limits of the legislative power within a structure 
of separated powers by ensuring that members can realize their ambitions 
and interests only through Congress. A collective Congress exercising 
exclusively legislative powers aligns the ambitions of representatives 
and senators with Congress as an institution. While the pull of private 
and individual interests may drive members, the Constitution prohibits 
members from exercising executive (or judicial) powers, so they must 
focus their ambitions on the difficult business of enacting laws. This 
provides a solution, perhaps the only solution, for ensuring the 
institutional strength and independence of Congress within the federal 
government. 
The Article concludes by considering some implications of the
collective Congress for the power delegated to administrative agencies. 
It challenges the premise that administrative values of expertise, 
                                                                                                                     
10. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001).
6
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efficiency, and flexibility can substitute for the Constitution’s collective 
legislative power, which promotes representation, deliberation, and the 
general good. The existence and operation of the collective Congress 
forms the foundation of the political society and reinforces that 
nondelegation is a deep feature of the constitutional structure and 
republican government. Regulation by executive agencies can never 
share the fundamental features of collective representative lawmaking. 
A full discussion of the implications of the collective Congress is part of 
a larger project and goes beyond the scope of this Article, but the 
collective Congress can provide a framework for analyzing various 
separation of powers questions.
As the unitary executive elucidates the proper exercise of “executive 
power,” the collective Congress is a structural feature that provides a 
powerful conceptual framework for understanding the scope of the 
“legislative power” and how Congress may exercise it. The 
administrative state blurs the lines between the executive and legislative 
powers. The collective Congress sharpens that line and helps explain 
why Congress still matters in our system of government.
I. COLLECTIVE CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE POWER AND REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT
This Part recovers the meaning and importance of the “legislative 
power” vested in Congress. Understanding the legislative power has
more than theoretical interest in a society predominated by 
administrative law. The affirmative value of a representative legislature
undermines a common theme: that executive lawmaking can serve as an 
easy substitute for congressional lawmaking. Progressives who favored 
regulation over legislation understood that this was inimical to our 
constitutional form of government. They offered expertise, efficiency, 
and flexibility as a replacement to the old constitutional forms of 
separation of powers. Yet lawmaking by a representative legislature 
offers other values that are now often forgotten. 
This Part examines key political theorists who influenced the 
Framers—including Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau—and their 
conception of the legislative power. It then considers how the Framers 
understood the legislative power and the particular form of legislative
power vested in Congress. The theory and history provide a foundation 
for reconsidering the centrality of legislative power to the creation and 
maintenance of a republican form of government, to the values served by 
collective decisionmaking, and to the preservation of the rule of law 
within society.
As the Framers understood, special, private, and narrow interests will 
always exist—it is just a question of how they are expressed. While the 
Framers envisioned a certain legislative ideal focused on the general 
7
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good, they also understood that such an ideal would be pursued by real 
institutions run by real people.12 The modern administrative state has 
certainly not eliminated special interests or perfected republican ideals 
of deliberation and accountability. This Part recalls the foundations for 
why a collective legislature was once considered the best mechanism for 
avoiding the intractable problems of self-interest in a society committed 
to the rule of law and the protection of individual liberty and property.
A. Political Theory of Collective Legislative Power
The Framers studied political theory and in particular the works of 
Locke and Montesquieu.13 Although there is less evidence of his 
influence on the Framers, Rousseau’s political theory was well known at 
the time and helps elucidate the legislative power. Several important 
principles emerge from these thinkers. First, the creation of a 
representative, collective lawmaking power is central to the social 
compact and the creation of a political entity. Second, collective 
lawmaking best promotes the general good through the process of 
representation and the negotiation of competing interests. Third, 
preserving the integrity of legislative power requires its insulation from 
the executive and judicial powers. The exclusivity of legislative power 
provides an important separation of powers principle that protects the 
independence of all three branches. Legislation can be corrupted by a 
focus on execution and particular applications of the law. The executive 
cannot make the laws because it is concerned with the particular and is 
not a collective representative body empowered to reflect the general 
will. This reaffirms why the legitimate exercise of legislative power 
requires collective and exclusive lawmaking in the legislature.
                                                                                                                     
12. Accordingly, the principle of a collective legislature aimed at the general good is not 
necessarily undermined by public choice theory. Public choice theory studies the incentives of 
various institutional actors to provide “a realistic, and often restorative, understanding of 
collective action and institutions.” MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW, at x (2009); see also MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1 (1965) (“The view that groups 
act to serve their interests presumably is based upon the assumption that the individuals in groups 
act out of self-interest. If the individuals in a group altruistically disregarded their personal 
welfare, it would not be very likely that collectively they would seek some selfish common or 
group objective.”); James M. Buchanan, The Public Choice Perspective, in 13 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 15 (2000).
13. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 151–
52, 162 (1969).
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1. Collective Lawmaking as the Foundation for Liberal 
Political Society
The Constitution reflects a political theory that places representative,
collective lawmaking power at the foundation of political society. When 
trading the laws of nature for the laws of men, the establishment of a 
collective legislature provides the mechanism for bringing the diverse 
interests of the people into one society to enact laws for the benefit of all 
of the people. This social compact reflects a contractarian theory of 
government—the people provide consent to a particular form of 
government.14
The republican form of government provides one solution to the 
vexing problem of political association, the problem of how to form a 
legitimate lawmaking power that binds each individual even when the 
individual may not agree as to a particular law. Civil society requires all 
to follow the laws, because all have consented to be bound by the 
particular lawmaking power. Despite disagreement over the content of 
specific laws, citizens can consent to the legitimacy of a collective 
lawmaking power that represents their interests and enacts laws for the 
general good. The Constitution creates the contract between the people 
and the government. It is, however, the ongoing existence of the 
legislative power that allows for the continuation of the government by 
and for the people.
The legislature provides the common bond necessary for a
government. As John Locke explained, “’tis in their Legislative, that the 
Members of a Commonwealth are united, and combined together into 
one coherent living Body. This is the Soul that gives Form, Life, and 
Unity to the Commonwealth: From hence the several Members have their 
mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion.”15 Rousseau similarly 
explained, “this act of association produces a moral and collective body,
composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, 
which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life, and 
its will.”16
Locke refers to the legislature as the “soul”; Rousseau called it the 
“heart.”17 For both philosophers, a community unites and lives through 
                                                                                                                     
14. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,
102 YALE L.J. 907, 939 (1993) (“[Unlike in England,] Americans could observe in their various 
charters and, later, constitutions more tangible examples of the contract of government. Already 
in the 1770’s, the state-of-nature or modern natural rights analysis appears to have been the 
dominant theoretical justification for revolution and written constitutions.”). 
15. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 212 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
16. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 53.
17. See id. at 53, 99.
9
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the legislature because it is through the collective lawmaking power that 
the people can influence each other, develop sympathy for others’
perspectives, and establish effective government.
The consent of individuals creates a government and, importantly, a 
legislature that can act as “one body.”18 Locke explains that ordinarily 
such a legislature will proceed through a majority of its members, and 
sometimes through a greater number.19 The majority represents the 
whole and can exercise the legislative power in a manner that binds 
everyone.20 Individual liberty within society is “to be under no other 
Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the Common-
wealth, nor under the Dominion of any Will, or Restraint of any Law, but 
what that Legislative shall enact, according to the Trust put in it.”21
The legislature provides the possibility of uniting a disparate group of 
people into one society—one government—by providing a forum for 
negotiating and mediating diverse interests. A collective, representative 
legislature can secure an individual’s life and property by promulgating 
laws that apply equally to each person. The existence of such a 
lawmaking power equally applied reduces the people’s apprehension 
from tyranny and absolute, arbitrary power. As Locke explained, a 
person’s life and property are only safe when the
Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call 
them Senate, Parliament, or what you please. By which 
means every single person became subject, equally with 
other the meanest men, to those Laws, which he himself, as 
part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by 
his own Authority, avoid the force of the Law, when once 
made, nor by any pretence of Superiority, plead exemption, 
thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his 
Dependants. No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from 
the Laws of it. For if any Man may do what he thinks fit, and 
there be no Appeal on Earth, for Redress or Security against 
any harm he shall do; I ask, Whether he be not perfectly Still
                                                                                                                     
18. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 95.
19. Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 96.
20. Id. (“For when any number of Men have, by the consent of every individual, made a 
Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, 
which is only by the will and determination of the majority. . . . [I]t is necessary the Body should 
move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it 
is impossible it should act or continue one Body, one community . . . and so every one is bound 
by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in Assemblies 
impowered to act by positive Laws where no number is set by that positive Law which impowers 
them, the act of the Majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having 
by the Law of Nature and Reason, the power of the whole.”); see also id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 99.
21. Id. bk. II, ch. IV, § 22.  
10
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in the State of Nature, and so can be no part or Member of 
that Civil Society.22
Collective lawmaking ensures the greatest security for equal 
application of the laws because it provides a mechanism for negotiating 
people’s different interests. Therefore, such lawmaking protects property 
because no man can be a law unto himself. This also means that no person 
has pretense to be exempt from the law. While each person is part of the 
legislative power, each person is also subject to the laws. Moving from 
the state of nature requires the creation of a collective legislative power 
that promulgates laws for everyone in society. 
Also, throughout his discussion of legislative power Locke refers to 
“the legislative” as the collective body that exercises the legislative 
power.23 Importantly, he does not use the term legislators, only 
representatives. This is consistent with his view that the legislative 
power should be collective. Members of the legislature are not 
legislators, or lawmakers, because they cannot make the law 
individually. Instead they are representatives in a body that is “the 
legislative.”24
Montesquieu similarly emphasizes the connection between law and 
safety for individuals: “The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility 
of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order 
to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one 
man need not be afraid of another.”25 Liberty encompasses the tranquility 
of mind that follows from living under the rule of law. This statement 
precedes Montesquieu’s frequently cited statements about the separation 
of powers. It explains that liberty requires the safety of living within the 
rule of law where separated powers frustrate tyranny, arbitrary control, 
and oppression.26
Legislative power serves as the foundation of a civil society and if
such power breaks, the society fails. Locke stresses: “when the 
Legislative is broken, or dissolved, Dissolution and Death follows. For 
the Essence and Union of the Society consisting in having one Will, the 
Legislative, when once established by the Majority, has the declaring, 
                                                                                                                     
22. Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 94 (emphasis added); see also id. § 143 (“[I]n well order’d
Commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the Legislative Power 
is put into the hands of divers Persons who duly Assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with 
others, a Power to make Laws . . . .” (emphasis added)).
23. Id. bk. II, ch. XI, §§ 134–42.
24. Today we frequently speak of lawmakers or legislators, but that terminology was not 
commonly used at the Founding.
25. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)
(1748).
26. See id. at 152.
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and as it were keeping of that Will.”27 The collective legislature 
represents and keeps the will of society—it provides the ongoing 
mechanism for bringing together, negotiating, and resolving the different 
interests in society. When the legislative power no longer functions or is 
dissolved, the union and civil society are in peril, for the people have no 
legitimate means of collecting their interests and expressing their will 
together.
A representative and collective legislature does not just gather up the 
different opinions in society, but subjects those opinions to reasoned 
deliberation. As Montesquieu highlights, the legislature promotes liberty 
by providing a manageable forum for considering the interests of the 
people and for “discussing public affairs.”28 Deliberation constitutes an 
essential component of legislative power because it allows the people’s 
representatives to ascertain the general good and provides for the 
exercise of reason in determining the best course for society. 
The legislative power may be corrupted in a variety of ways, each of 
which highlights the importance of collective lawmaking. First, the 
executive may dissolve or corrupt the legislature.29 As Rousseau stated, 
the state might dissolve when the executive “no longer administers the 
state in accordance with the laws and usurps the sovereign power.”30 In 
these circumstances, the executive eviscerates the legislative power. As 
Locke explained:
For if any one by force takes away the establish’d
Legislative of any Society, and the Laws by them made 
pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the Umpirage,
which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision 
of all their Controversies, and a bar to the state of War 
amongst them. They, who remove, or change the Legislative, 
take away this decisive power, which no Body can have, but 
by the appointment and consent of the People . . . . [B]y
removing the Legislative establish’d by the Society (in 
whose decisions the People acquiesced and united, as to that 
of their own will) they unty the Knot, and expose the People 
a new to the state of War.31
The collective legislative power can be corrupted by an executive 
who seizes power or fails to execute the laws faithfully. In either
instance, the collective legislative will has unraveled, and the social 
                                                                                                                     
27. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 212.
28. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 25, at 154. Montesquieu notes that a representative body 
provides a “great advantage . . . i[n] their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people 
collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.” Id.
29. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 222.
30. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 97.
31. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 227 (emphasis added).
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contract is undone. Without a representative legislature, there is no 
legitimate power to umpire and to provide peaceful resolution between 
the different opinions in society.
Second, and for Locke and Rousseau even more dangerous to the 
legislative power, the legislature may act against the collective trust 
placed in them. For Rousseau, “when the members of the government 
separately usurp the power they ought only to exercise as a body[, t]his 
is no less an infraction of the laws, and produces even greater disorder.”32
The “greater disorder” occurs when members of the legislature act 
individually rather than collectively. Similarly, Locke observes that 
representatives may unravel the legislative power by seizing it for 
themselves or delegating it to others:
Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this 
fundamental Rule of Society; and either by Ambition, Fear, 
Folly or Corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put 
into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the 
Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of 
Trust they forfeit the Power, the people had put into their 
hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, 
who have a Right to resume their original Liberty, and, by 
the Establishment of a new Legislative . . . provide for their 
own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are 
in Society.33
Again, the establishment of a legitimate legislature is associated with 
“safety and security.” The legislature transgresses the power delegated 
from the people when it grasps for itself or puts into the hands of another 
person “an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the 
People.”34 The legislature must be collective and in the form originally 
created—it cannot be exercised by individual legislators or the executive. 
The existence of a collective legislature is a prerequisite for uniting the 
people; without such a collective power, the government dissolves. The 
collective and representative legislature connects the people and allows 
them to make laws for the benefit of all members of society.
The centrality of the collective legislature is further reinforced in the 
fact that the state, as a political association, persists through the 
maintenance of the collective legislative power, not through particular 
laws that have been enacted. As Rousseau states, 
                                                                                                                     
32. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 98.
33. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 222 (emphasis added).
34. Id. This highlights the dangers of delegation of legislative power and the problem with 
conveying this power outside of the representative and collective legislature; it is, in short, the 
problem of the modern administrative state. See infra Part IV.
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It is not through laws that the State subsists, it is through 
the legislative power. Yesterday’s law does not obligate 
today, but tacit consent is presumed from silence, and the 
sovereign is assumed to confirm constantly the laws it does 
not repeal while having the power to do so.35
Locke explains that if the legislature is prevented from meeting, “the 
Legislative is altered. For ’tis not a certain number of Men, no, nor their 
meeting, unless they have also Freedom of debating, and Leisure of 
perfecting, what is for the good of the Society . . . . For it is not Names,
that Constitute Governments, but the use and exercise of those Powers 
that were intended to accompany them . . . .”36 The government requires 
the preservation of the legislature in its proper collective form because 
the exercise of lawmaking power enables civil society and the resolution 
of disputes through a peaceful and binding process. The state depends on 
the ongoing existence and effectiveness of the legislature and rule by the 
lawmaking power.37
Today we frequently speak of the rule of law with respect to the courts 
and the executive, which are bound to follow the enacted laws. Yet at a 
more foundational level, the rule of law means the availability of a 
lawmaking power that represents the general will.  The executive and the 
judiciary must follow the law, but the rule of law applies also to the 
legislature. It means ruling through the making of laws rather than, for 
instance, through the issuance of edicts or the like.
2. Collective Lawmaking Promotes General Laws for the General Good
Collective and representative lawmaking relates to another 
fundamental principle of law: that legislation should focus on the general 
good rather than particular applications or personal preferences. As
Rousseau said, legislation has legitimacy only when it applies equally to 
all and has “no other object than the general good.”38 Generality has been 
a hallmark of law for centuries, originating in Greek and Roman political 
philosophy. Aristotle noted, “[L]aw can do no more than generalize.”39
Friedrich Hayek identified generality as a foremost principle of 
constitutional law.40 Through deliberation and the requirement of 
                                                                                                                     
35. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 99.
36. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 215 (emphasis added).
37. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN 
EXECUTIVE POWER 200 (1989) (“The rule of law for Locke clearly means the rule of the law-
making power, not the ascendancy or inviolability of certain laws; it is the rule of the men who 
make the laws.”).
38. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 63.
39. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 23 (1967) 
(citing Aristotle’s Ethics V.10).
40. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 149, 151, 155 (1960).
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss1/1
2018] WHY CONGRESS MATTERS 15
majority rule, a legislature would provide the best mechanism for 
representing the general will and aiming at the common good. Collective 
lawmaking provides the greatest likelihood of producing good 
legislation, understood as stable and general laws. 
The difficultly, however, lies in ascertaining and promoting the 
general good when most individuals are primarily interested in pursuing 
private or particular goods. Contrasting the public good with the private 
or particular good, Locke and Rousseau focus on how to eliminate 
particular interests from the enacted law and how to align the individual 
interests of the representatives with the common good. As David Hume 
wrote, the best government aligns the separate interests of each official
with the public interest; without such an alignment one can expect 
“disorder[] and tyranny.”41
Rousseau provides one of the subtler understandings of how the 
individual will relates to the general will. He was adamant that the law 
could have only general, not particular, objects. If the law pertained to 
particular individuals or particular facts, it could not properly reflect the 
general will.42 Rousseau feared the tendency of the personal, private 
impulse to take precedence over the general will. Although in a “perfect 
[act of] legislation, the private or individual will should be null . . . and 
consequently the general or sovereign will always [be] dominant,” in 
reality the general will is the weakest and “the private will is the first of 
all. So that each member of the government is first himself, and then 
magistrate, and then citizen—a gradation that is exactly opposite to the 
one required by the social order.”43
Individual representatives are part of the collective legislature, and 
good legislation depends on their sharing the general good along with 
other citizens. Yet representatives, like all individuals, naturally privilege 
their private gain and misfortune over the public gain and misfortune. As 
Rousseau explains:
Each person, detaching his interest from the common 
interest, sees perfectly well that he cannot completely
                                                                                                                     
41. DAVID HUME, Of the Independency of Parliament, in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID 
HUME 39, 42 (1854) (“[W]e should always consider the separate interest of each court, and each 
order; and, if we find that, by the skillful division of power, this interest must necessarily, in its 
operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, 
on the contrary, separate interest be not checked, and be not directed to the public we ought to 
look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such a government.”).
42. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 66 (“[T]here is no general will concerning a particular 
object. . . . When I say that the object of the laws is always general, I mean that the law considers
the subjects as a body and actions in the abstract, never a man as an individual or a particular 
action.”).
43. Id. at 82.
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separate himself from it; but his share of the public 
misfortune seems like nothing to him compared to the 
exclusive good that he claims he is getting. With the 
exception of this private good, he wants the general good in 
his own interest just as vigorously as anyone else.44
The exclusive, individual, private good will therefore frequently
(maybe always) outweigh the public good. Rousseau states, perhaps 
ironically, that “apart from this private good,” the legislator wants the 
general good as vigorously as anyone.45 The private good is always there, 
stronger than the collective, general good. 
Nonetheless, representative legislatures are most likely to promulgate 
laws for the general rather than the particular good.46 By requiring the 
agreement of some number of representatives, legislation can be 
produced only through deliberation, negotiation, and compromise—a
process that encourages more general laws. As Rousseau says,
Because either the will is general, or it is not. It is the will of 
the people as a body, or of only a part. In the first case, this 
declared will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law. In 
the second case, it is merely a private will, or an act of
magistracy; it is at most a decree.47
Similarly, Montesquieu criticizes lawmaking through decrees and 
exemptions because the “particular favor” may become a general rule, 
and those who apply for laws “are improper guides to the legislator; the 
facts are always wrongly stated.”48
Locke explains that such laws should follow a specific process and 
should be “promulgated standing laws,” not “extemporary arbitrary 
decrees.”49 Law would depend not on the private judgment of each 
individual, as it did in the state of nature, but rather “by settled Standing 
                                                                                                                     
44. Id. at 109; see also id. at 55 (“His private interest can speak to him quite differently 
from the common interest. His absolute and naturally independent existence can bring him to view
what he owes the common cause as a free contribution, the loss of which will harm others less 
than its payment burdens him.”).
45. Id. at 109. 
46. Id. at 108. 
47. Id. at 59–60.
48. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 25, at 169.
49. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XI, § 136; see also id. § 137 (“[T]he Ruling Power 
ought to govern by declared and received Laws, and not by extemporary Dictates and 
undetermined Resolutions. For then Mankind will be in a far worse condition, than in the State of 
Nature . . . . For all the power the Government has, being only for the good of the Society, as it 
ought not to be Arbitrary and at Pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and 
promulgated Laws; that both the People may know their Duty, and be safe and secure within the 
limits of the Law.”).
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Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties.”50 This relates to the 
classic rule of law values of notice, stability, and predictability in legal 
arrangements. 
Moreover, general laws would have equal application to the people, 
securing their individual liberty and property rights. As Rousseau 
explains, the social contract requires each person to give his rights from 
the state of nature to the community, and “since each one gives his entire 
self, the condition is equal for everyone, and since the condition is equal 
for everyone, no one has an interest in making it burdensome for the 
others.”51 Fundamentally, the safety and liberty provided by government 
derives from collective decisionmaking because legislators will assemble 
to make laws, then return to private life, subject to the laws that they have 
made. Without the possibility of exemptions for themselves, their friends 
and supporters, the lawmakers will “take care” to make laws for the 
“publick good.”52
Mutual interests between the people and the lawmakers encourage 
generally applicable laws. Such laws best serve individual liberty 
because the lawmakers and the people are united in their collective 
interests. Although a representative legislature could, of course, agree to 
enact laws to promote particular interests, it is the form most likely to 
promote generality and equal application of the law. Creating legitimate 
and good law is essentially intertwined with representative legislatures 
and with individual liberty.53
3. Separation of Powers: Exclusivity of the Legislative Power
The previous Section explained why legislation must focus on the 
general or common good, not particular matters. This principle 
constitutes an essential feature of the separation of powers between the 
legislature and the executive and judiciary. The institution that makes the 
law should not be concerned with the law’s particular applications. 
Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu all agree that a good government 
requires an exclusive legislative power. 
Exclusivity here refers to two principles: first, the legislature can 
exercise only legislative power, not the power to execute or implement 
the law in particular matters. Second, only the legislature may exercise 
legislative power. This means the executive, concerned as it is with 
particular matters, cannot also act as a lawmaker. Although an exclusive 
                                                                                                                     
50. Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 87.
51. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 53.
52. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XII, § 143.
53. Modern administration in its very structure is so specialized and compartmentalized that 
agencies rarely reflect the range of interests of the general public across multiple issues. The White 
House and centralized review provides some remedy for this, but cannot replicate the type of 
generality of a representative legislature. See infra Conclusion.
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legislative power did not exist in England or France (or anywhere else)
in 1789, the U.S. Constitution comes very close to this ideal separation 
of the legislative power from the other powers of government.
Under the first principle of exclusivity, the legislature can exercise 
only legislative power. Rousseau insists that the lawmaker cannot 
execute precisely because the legislature represents the public will and 
therefore should be concerned with general matters. He explains:
It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute 
them, nor for the body of people to turn its attention away 
from general considerations to particular objects. Nothing is 
more dangerous than the influence of private interests on 
public affairs; and the abuse of laws by the government is a 
lesser evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the 
inevitable consequence of private considerations.54
Particular matters corrupt the lawmaker, who should focus on the 
general good. Since execution relates to particular applications, not the 
general rule, lawmakers should not execute the laws. 
Those who command the law “should also not have authority over 
men. Otherwise, his laws, ministers of his passions, would often only 
perpetuate his injustices, and he could never avoid having private views 
alter the sanctity of his work.”55 If the lawmaker also has control over 
execution, his laws will be unjust because his private opinions will 
corrupt his proper lawmaking role. The corruption of the lawmaker, by 
which Rousseau means the focus of the lawmaker on particular or private 
matters, threatens the essence of the legislature as the representation of 
the general will.
Montesquieu similarly stresses that the representative legislature can 
only enact laws, but not execute them: 
Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for 
the executive part of government, for which it is not so fit; 
but for the enacting of laws, or to see whether the laws in 
being are duly executed, a thing suited to their abilities, and 
which none indeed but themselves can properly perform.56
The legislative power cannot “stay the executive,” but “it has a right 
and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have 
been executed.”57 The legislature may examine the executive’s actions,
what today we would call oversight, but cannot prevent the executive 
                                                                                                                     
54. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 84–85.
55. Id. at 68.
56. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 25, at 155.
57. Id. at 157–58.
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from executing laws. The legislature’s role in “examining” presupposes 
a legislature without the power to execute the laws.
The first principle of exclusivity is that the legislature can exercise 
only lawmaking power. The second principle of exclusivity is that the 
lawmaking power can be exercised only by the collective legislature, and 
not by the executive. As Locke explained: “nor can any Edict of any 
Body else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power soever 
backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its 
Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and 
appointed.”58 Once the public consents to a collective legislature, this is 
the only body that can issue laws. 
Locke and Rousseau reinforce the exclusivity of legislative power by 
insisting on a principle of nondelegation. Only the legislature can make 
laws and its grant of authority from the people to make laws does not 
include the authority to delegate or grant lawmaking power to the 
executive or another entity. Locke explained:
The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making 
Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power 
from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to 
others. . . . And when the People have said, We will submit 
to rules, and be govern’d by Laws made by such Men, and 
in such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make 
Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but
such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and 
Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the 
Legislative being derived from the People by a positive 
voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what 
the positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make 
Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have 
no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and 
place it in other hands.59
Rousseau similarly suggests the sovereignty reflected in legislative 
power is inalienable since “sovereignty being only the exercise of the 
general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign, which is only 
a collective being, can only be represented by itself. Power can perfectly 
well be transferred, but not will.”60 The collective legislative will cannot 
be transferred.
Locke conceives of a separation between the legislature and the 
executive because they exercise different rights from the state of nature.
                                                                                                                     
58. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XI, § 134.
59. Id. bk. II, ch. XII, § 141. 
60. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 59 (emphasis added).
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As Harvey Mansfield explains, in Locke’s theory, “No single person, that 
is, can have both legislative and executive power in civil society, as every 
person does in the state of nature. No one can have both natural power 
and political power.”61 Legislative power vests in bodies of men, whereas
the executive power will usually vest in one person. Locke, however,
does not press the necessity of the unitary executive to the same extent 
as the fundamental requirement of a collective legislature.
Although Locke and Rousseau acknowledge some flexibility in 
execution of the law, they firmly maintain that such discretion is not a 
legislative power. For instance, Locke recognizes a prerogative power 
that allows the executive to act without sanction of law, or sometimes 
against the law, for the common good.62 This power may arise because 
of exigent circumstances and the flexibility required for the application 
of law. Locke nowhere suggests, however, that this prerogative power
includes a lawmaking power. Rather, he emphasizes that the lawmaking 
power can be exercised only by the legislative power authorized by the 
people, and that those who seek to remove the legislature are usurpers 
who “unty the Knot” of society and exercise only “Force without 
Authority.”63
Recognizing the necessity for flexibility in the executive, Rousseau 
explains when there is peril “the general will is not in doubt, and it is 
evident that the first intention of the people is that the state should not 
perish. In this manner, the suspension of legislative authority does not 
abolish it.”64 Yet Rousseau also explicitly states that the executive cannot 
make the law: “The magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he 
dominates it without being able to represent it. He can do anything but 
make laws.”65 While Locke and Rousseau recognize that the executive 
possesses a limited prerogative to modify or to suspend legislation when 
circumstances warrant, they also insist that the executive cannot make 
the law. Only the people’s representatives can collectively make law.
Moreover, the combination of legislative and executive powers, in 
particular, can lead to tyranny. For Locke, if the legislative and executive 
powers are joined,
                                                                                                                     
61. MANSFIELD, JR., supra note 37, at 199.
62. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIV, §§ 159–60.
63. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 227 (“They, who remove, or change 
the Legislative, take away this decisive power, which no Body can have, but by the appointment 
and consent of the People . . . . And thus by removing the Legislative establish’d by the Society 
(in whose decisions the People acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they unty the 
Knot, and expose the People a new to the state of War.”).
64. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 121.
65. Id. at 121–22.
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humane frailty apt to grasp at Power . . . they may exempt 
themselves from Obedience to the Laws they make, and suit 
the Law, both in its making and execution, to their own 
private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct 
interest from the rest of the Community, contrary to the end 
of Society and Government.66
Allowing for the combination of the general law with the particular 
application, allows government officials to seize power for personal gain, 
contrary to the general good that is the purpose of government.
Montesquieu similarly argues against the combination of the 
executive and legislative powers, noting that if the executive power 
“should be committed to a certain number of persons selected from the 
legislative body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reason the two 
powers would be united, as the same persons would sometimes possess, 
and would be always able to possess, a share in both.”67 If legislators 
could serve as executive officials, it would allow for the combination of 
lawmaking with execution, effectively ending liberty.
***
The political theorists closest to the Framers developed the centrality 
of the collective and representative legislative power as the bond between 
individuals in society. The legislature provided a mechanism for 
umpiring inevitable disputes and resolving them through the enactment 
of law. Such a legislature provides the greatest security for an 
individual’s life, liberty, and property. These principles provide a further 
understanding of the deep structure against the delegation of legislative 
power outside the collective legislature. Executive lawmaking unravels 
the social compact and the basic principles of republican government. To
maintain the integrity of the legislative power and its focus on the general 
good, the legislative power should be exercised by a representative 
legislature and that legislature should not have a part in exercising the 
other powers of government. 
B. The Framers and the Collective Congress
The Framers adopted many of the insights of this political theory and 
applied it to their experience with English parliamentary government and 
the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation. Representative 
collective lawmaking is often taken for granted in our system, in part 
because no one questions that the Constitution’s legislative power must 
be exercised by Congress, a collective lawmaking institution. The 
Framers disagreed about many aspects of the national legislature—its 
                                                                                                                     
66. LOCKE, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. XII, § 143.
67. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 25, at 156.
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precise form, the number of representatives, how representation would 
be divided, and the rules for voting. On the fundamental question of a 
multimember Congress, however, there was no disagreement. This is
unsurprising, since collective representative lawmaking was at the heart 
of the Framers’ practical experience with, and theoretical understanding 
of, republican government. Even today, in the face of an expansive 
administrative state, the principle that “legislative power” must be 
exercised by the collective Congress remains an article of faith.68 Yet in 
the modern era, this commitment to representative lawmaking often 
stands as a mere formality in the face of substantial functional lawmaking 
outside of Congress. 
This Section examines why the Framers believed collective 
lawmaking provided the essential foundation for the national 
government. First, the people of the nation could be united only through 
a representative lawmaking power. Collective legislative power would 
unite the people of the various states by creating an institution that could 
address their shared problems and promote the general good. This was 
an important aspect of the fiduciary relationship of “public trust” 
between the people and the federal government reflected in the 
Constitution.69 Second, the Framers considered factions inevitable and 
yet dangerous to the public good. The collective Congress provided their
unique solution to the difficult question of how to maintain a
representative government while minimizing the influence of personal, 
particular, and factional interests in lawmaking. 
1.  Collective Legislative Power as the Mechanism for Bringing 
People Together
Although the Framers feared an overly powerful Congress, “drawing 
all power into its impetuous vortex,”70 they also recognized that political 
association and the creation of a federal government required the 
existence of an effective lawmaking power. As Alexander Hamilton 
wrote, “Government implies the power of making laws.”71 Corruption 
and failure of legislative power is a serious problem—without a 
functioning legislative power, the core of political society collapses and 
                                                                                                                     
68. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (upholding 
agency’s authority while recognizing that “Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of 
those powers”); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (stating that nondelegation is “a principle 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the constitution”).
69. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L.
REV. 1077 (2004) (developing the ideal of fiduciary government and the public trust doctrine 
within the Constitution). 
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 11, at 257 (James Madison).
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 11, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the people lack a legitimate mechanism to enact laws that bind all 
members of the society. The Framers chose a structure for Congress that 
would promote the government’s responsibility to maintain the public 
trust. The Constitution vests the legislative power in a collective 
Congress that first unites the diverse interests of the society and, second, 
promotes generality and the equal application of the laws. 
For the Framers, a representative legislature established the 
mechanism for collecting and uniting the interests of the people. After 
all, government is a collective enterprise—a way to protect liberty and 
property rights, and to provide common solutions to shared problems. As 
John Adams explained, 
[A representative assembly] is the only instrument by 
which the body of the people can act; the only way in which 
their opinions can be known and collected; the only means 
by which their wills can be united, and their strength exerted, 
according to any principle or continued system.72
A representative legislature provides the most legitimate institution 
for identifying the opinions of the people, collecting them together, and 
negotiating their interests.
Through the Constitution, the people consent to be bound by the laws 
made by Congress. This consent legitimizes the laws Congress enacts. In
The Essex Result, Theophilus Parsons stressed that the legislative power 
requires the consent of the majority, which derives from the fundamental 
conditions of the social compact: 
This supreme power is composed of the powers of each 
individual collected together, and voluntarily parted with by 
him. . . . Each individual also surrenders the power of 
controuling his natural alienable rights, only when the good 
of the whole requires it. The supreme power therefore can 
do nothing but what is for the good of the whole; and when 
it goes beyond this line, it is a power usurped.73
Parsons’s reading reflects a common understanding that legislative 
power extended only so far as the people’s consent. Logically, the 
                                                                                                                     
72. JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 119, 120 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
73. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE ESSEX RESULT (1780), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 112, 115 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); see also id. at 116 (“No 
man consented that his natural alienable rights should be wantonly controuled: they were 
controulable, only when that controul should be subservient to the good of the whole; and that 
subserviency, from the very nature of the government, can be determined but by one absolute
judge.”).
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people’s consent extended only to laws enacted for the “good of the 
whole.”74 As in Locke and Rousseau, if the legislature should fail to 
represent the general good, it usurps the power of the people and violates 
its fiduciary duties.
In practice, collective lawmaking should work towards the good of 
the whole. For instance, a collective Congress would promote 
deliberation, because agreement between diverse interests would require 
discussion and negotiation to produce legislation that could receive a 
majority vote in the House and Senate. The Framers occasionally 
expressed optimism that a legislative assembly, at its best, could reflect 
the reason of the public in government.75 In part, there would be 
negotiation and debate, but also a refinement of the views of the public. 
As Madison noted, “[A] majority of the whole society could seldom take 
place upon any other principles, than those of justice and the general 
good.”76 Diverse views would be filtered through the process of enacting 
legislation thereby improving the final law.
Similarly, the collective legislative process would help secure liberty 
by making it difficult to combine for purposes of corruption. As Madison 
observed,
It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the 
members of an Assembly would lose their capacity for 
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the 
restraints of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty 
of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security 
to the public. And if one or a few members only should be 
seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would 
maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body.77
The form of collective decisionmaking would discourage the 
corruption of Congress as an institution and encourage the fulfillment of 
the public trust.
In addition, collective lawmaking would encourage, if not guarantee, 
equal application of the laws, a value essential to the rule of law in a 
republican government. As with Locke and Rousseau, John Adams 
explained, a republic is “only a government, in which all men, rich and 
poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, 
                                                                                                                     
74. Id. at 114. 
75. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 271 (James Madison).
77. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 332–33
(1966) (referring to the statement of James Madison).
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the first citizen and the last, are equally subject to the laws.”78 Everyone, 
including the lawmakers, would be subject to the laws. 
Adams also highlighted the importance of “safety” under the laws for 
the liberty and property of every individual in society.79 The safety would
be guaranteed by the vital connection between the representatives and 
the people. As Madison explained:
[T]hey can make no law which will not have its full 
operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the 
great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one 
of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect 
the rulers and the people together. It creates between them 
that communion of interest, and sympathy of 
sentiments, . . . without which every government 
degenerates into tyranny.80
The representatives in Congress are bound to the people not only 
through election, but also through their shared interests as members of 
the community. Laws will affect the mass of people along with the 
lawmakers and their families and friends. Equal application of the laws 
would provide security to the people that their lawmakers would enact 
only those laws under which they would also want to live. Regular 
elections would ensure the fidelity of the representative to his electors 
and their common interests.81
                                                                                                                     
78. ADAMS, supra note 72, at 119.
79. Id. (“It implies, moreover, that the property and liberty of all men, not merely of a 
majority, should be safe; for the people, or public, comprehends more than a majority, it 
comprehends all and every individual . . . .”).
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 11, at 297 (James Madison); see also id. (“If it be 
asked, what is to restrain the house of representatives from making legal discriminations in favour
of themselves, and a particular class of the society? I answer, the genius of the whole system; the 
nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates 
the people of America; a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.”). 
81. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 103, 104 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[T]hat the elected might 
never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the 
propriety of having elections often: because as the elected might by that means return and mix 
again with the general body of the electors . . . their fidelity to the public will be secured by the 
prudent reflection of not making a rod for themselves. And as this frequent interchange will 
establish a common interest with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally 
support each other, and on this . . . depends the strength of government, and the happiness of the 
governed.”); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787,
at 164 (1969) (“[T]he multitude collectively always are true in intention to the interest of the 
public, because it is their own. They are the public.” (citing 3 JOHN WITHERSPOON, WORKS OF 
WITHERSPOON 434)). 
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In a modern era of widespread exemptions for Congress from federal 
laws as well as exemptions for well-placed groups,82 the vitality of this 
principle has been lost. As John Jay wrote, the national government 
would be weak “if it should forget, that the good of the whole can only 
be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members 
which compose the whole.”83
Mindful of the limitations of government, the Framers created a 
collective Congress that promotes the generality of lawmaking and its 
equal application to all citizens through a variety of mechanisms 
designed to align the interests of the lawmaker with the public.84 The 
collective Congress within the structure of the Constitution was designed
to ensure the lawmaker maintains the public trust and the purposes for 
which the government was created, namely the public good. 
2. Mediating Factions, Avoiding Cabals
Taking a collective, representative legislature as the foundation for 
government, the Framers carefully considered the question of how such 
an entity could collect different interests to pursue the general good. As 
Madison said, “The regulation of these various and interfering interests,
forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of 
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of 
government.”85
A collective Congress provides representation of the people and a
mechanism for regulating particular and conflicting interests. Although 
the Framers recognized that there was no precise formula for the size of 
legislative assemblies,86 they understood the size chosen would affect the 
                                                                                                                     
82. See, e.g., Theodoric Meyer, Do as We Say, Congress Says, Then Does What It Wants,
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 31, 2013, 2:02 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/do-as-we-say-
congress-says-then-does-what-it-wants (listing a number of laws from which Congress has 
exempted itself, including whistleblower protections, health and safety requirements, and the 
Freedom of Information Act).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 11, at 336 (John Jay); see also RANDY BARNETT,
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (2016) (explaining that government cannot have strength and 
vigor by pursuing the interests of some—it must focus on the whole, each of the parts and 
members).
84. See infra Part IV (discussing collective Congress within the structure of the 
Constitution).
85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 44 (James Madison).
86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 11, at 287 (James Madison) (explaining that 
with respect to the number of representatives “no political problem is less susceptible of a precise 
solution”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 11, at 304 (James Madison). The number 
of representatives should not increase beyond a certain point because “[t]he countenance of the 
government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. 
The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by 
which its motions are directed.” Id.
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Congress’s operation, leadership, and accountability to the people. The 
Framers’ debates concerned varying judgments about the best way to 
represent a wide range of interests and to promote laws aimed at the 
general good. 
A truly republican government required that all individuals, districts, 
and regions be represented in legislative deliberations.87 Elections 
created the necessary direct relationship between the federal government 
and the people—“not only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of 
the fabric.”88 A related principle was equality of representation. As 
Wilson explained,
[A]s all authority was derived from the people, equal 
numbers of people ought to have an equal [number] of 
representatives . . . . Representatives of different districts 
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as 
their respective Constituents hold to each other. . . . [E]ach 
man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are 
therefore naturally equal.89
The equality of each person before the law was one of the foundations
of republican government and such equality required equal 
representation.
Madison repeatedly pressed the importance of a republican 
government having a broad base of popular representation: 
It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from 
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable 
proportion, or a favoured class of it . . . . It is sufficient for 
such a government, that the persons administering it be 
appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people . . . .90
Although the scope of suffrage was very limited by modern standards, 
the Framers argued for the principle of wide representation, which would 
connect the members of Congress with the people, ensuring that various 
interests of individuals and regions would be part of the deliberations 
within Congress. 
The crucial question remained, however, how members of Congress, 
attached to “local objects,” might work to benefit the “national prosperity 
                                                                                                                     
87. MADISON, supra note 77, at 375 (“[T]he interests & rights of every class should be duly 
represented & understood in the public Councils. . . . [T]he Country should be divided into 
districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally 
understand & sympathise, with the rights of the people in every part of the Community.”).
88. Id. at 167 (referring to Wilson’s statement).
89. Id. at 97–98 (referring to Wilson’s statement).
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 11, at 194 (James Madison).
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and happiness.”91 How can self-interested representatives move beyond 
narrow interests to serve the general good? Madison grappled with the 
difficulty that representatives must resolve public disputes despite their
individual interests in such disputes.
In a republican form of government, the legislators inevitably serve 
as both judge and party over the rights of citizens in the lawmaking 
process. As Madison writes in Federalist 10: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, 
not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with 
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and 
parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most 
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial 
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single 
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? 
and what are the different classes of legislators, but 
advocates and parties to the causes which they 
determine? . . . . Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves 
the judges; and the most numerous party, or in other words, 
the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.92
In this important passage, Madison invokes the necessity of an 
impartial judge between adverse parties—the maxim nemo iudex in sua 
causa, no man should be judge in his own cause—in the context of 
lawmaking.
The creation of law invariably reflects what Madison calls “so many 
judicial determinations” about the “rights of large bodies of citizens.” 
Legislation is like a judicial decision insofar as it sets the rights and 
obligations of citizens. Unlike a judicial decision by an impartial judge, 
however, self-interested representatives enact laws to which they are also 
subject. As Madison observes, in a republican form of government “the 
parties are, and must be, themselves the judges.”93 Lawmaking cannot be 
separated from the people who will be affected by the law. 
The collective Congress provides a mechanism for mitigating this 
difficulty. While representatives have self-interest and local concerns, 
they cannot make the law individually but must work together. If the 
“parties are, and must be, themselves the judges” in a representative 
                                                                                                                     
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 11, at 245 (James Madison) (“[T]he members of 
the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The states will 
be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided 
according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the 
prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual states.”).
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 44 (James Madison).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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government, law must be made by sufficiently large groups of 
representatives. A collective legislature allows for a lawmaking process 
that can aggregate and negotiate diverse interests in the enactment of 
laws. No one party or narrow interest should prevail. This was another 
reason for fixing the majority quorum and voting rules.94 If a minority 
could block legislation, “an interested minority might take advantage of 
it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, 
in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.”95 A
majority rule for lawmaking would promote the negotiation and 
equitable sacrifices necessary for the general good.
The parallel between adjudication and legislation highlights that 
legislation must meet certain political standards of impartiality and be 
directed at the national, not particular, good. The collective process for 
lawmaking ensures that no lawmaker can be a judge in his own cause, 
but rather must work with other lawmakers to determine the public good. 
Legislative or political impartiality requires that decisions benefit the 
people and that determinations turn not on self-interest, but on the
interest of the whole. 
Collective lawmaking also connects to due process—the legitimate 
exercise of the legislative power requires collective decisionmaking,
particularly regarding laws that affect the life, liberty, and property of 
individuals.96 Just as judges must be impartial between parties in the
exercise of judicial power, legislators must work collectively in order to 
exercise the type of impartiality that counts in legislation. This 
impartiality means that all the various interests of society are put through 
a process where representatives must reach agreement. Due process 
includes the specifics of Article I, Section 7, but more generally requires
collective legislation because this is most likely to promote the general 
good.
Madison and others assumed that the size of the nation would 
promote legislation that balanced various interests, rather than furthering
factions adverse to the public good.97 The Framers frequently 
distinguished a truly representative legislature from a “junto”98 that 
would rule through the influence of small groups.99 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                     
94. See infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 11, at 305 (James Madison).
96. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1788 (2012).
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 48 (James Madison). The size of national 
government “consist[s] in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the 
secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority[.]” Id.
98. Junto was understood to be a small political group or faction, often operating in secret.
E.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, Junto, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
99. See MADISON, supra note 77, at 451–52 (referring to Mercer and Gerry’s statements).
29
Rao: Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress in the Structural C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
30 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Framers cautioned against rule by “cabal,”100 or lawmaking in a 
“conclave” that would seek power and operate through intrigue and 
secrecy.101 A cabal or junto would serve its own interests, rather than the 
interests of the whole. These small groups could more easily pursue 
narrow interests and thereby corrupt the legislative power.102 Lawmaking 
by a small number leads to corruption of the lawmaking power and 
fundamentally fails to live up to the social contract to enact laws for the 
good of the whole.
In contrast to a junto or cabal, Congress would be a large, 
representative body, taking its actions in the open and visible to the 
public. The Constitution created a federal government designed to 
minimize the likelihood of cabals and small groups wielding the 
lawmaking power. This was one of the arguments for having a larger 
number of representatives—a point pressed throughout the Convention. 
Even at the very end of deliberations, Hamilton successfully proposed an 
increase in number of representatives because it was “on so narrow a 
scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in the people 
for their liberties.”103 Madison similarly considered that a larger 
Congress would allow for greater representation of diverse interests and 
would enable a closer connection and knowledge of the people.104 In 
addition, a smaller group was more capable of corruption.105
The size of the nation was thought a protection because coalitions in 
the government “could seldom take place upon any other principles, than 
those of justice and the general good.”106 “The genius of republican 
liberty” required deriving power from the people and entrusting that 
power “not in a few, but in a number of hands.”107 Madison argued at the 
Convention that enlarging the sphere of the republic was the “only 
                                                                                                                     
100. Id. at 577–78 (noting the main danger is “cabal”). 
101. For example, Wilson stressed the importance of publishing journals of the legislative 
proceedings, since “[t]he people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, 
and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.” Id. at 434.
(referring to Wilson’s statement); see also id. (“[I]t would give a just alarm to the people, to make 
a conclave of their Legislature.”).
102. For example, George Mason and others argued the House of Representatives should be 
comprised of a sufficiently large number of representatives to reflect the diversity of interests 
throughout the nation. Keeping with this idea, the Constitution fixes the number for a quorum, 
because “[i]f the Legislature should be able to reduce the number [of a quorum] at all, it might 
reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be governed by a Juncto [sic].” MADISON,
supra note 77, at 429 (referring to Mason’s statement).
103. Id. at 608 (referring to Hamilton’s statement).
104. Id. at 263 (referring to Madison’s statement).
105. Id. (noting Gerry’s statement of “[t]he larger the number, the less the danger of their 
being corrupted”).
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 271 (James Madison).
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 11, at 181 (James Madison).
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defence against the inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the 
democratic form of Govt.”108 Having a larger sphere would ensure that it 
would be difficult for a majority to unite in pursuit of an interest at odds 
with the whole.109 Yet Madison also cautioned against allowing the 
assembly to grow too large, because though it might be more democratic, 
a larger assembly would be more likely to be controlled by a few 
individuals.110
Collective lawmaking would be the primary (though not exclusive) 
safeguard against factional interests.111 For the Framers, lawmaking must 
address the diversity of interests and competition among factions within 
society to create laws for the benefit of all individuals.  To serve as true 
fiduciaries of the people and to exercise the public trust, members of 
Congress must work together to enact laws and cannot delegate their 
legislative power to the executive. Collective lawmaking by a 
sufficiently large number of representatives would promote making 
general rules for the whole of society. By requiring the mediation and 
negotiation of different interests, legislation that emerges from the 
process of bicameralism and presentment would best serve the good of 
each individual—not just particular groups or persons.
***
Founding Era political theory and the Framers connected the 
collective and representative legislature with certain fundamental 
features of a legitimate government. Lawmaking by the executive shares 
none of the features of a collective and representative legislature. The
legislative power is vested in a collective Congress in order to create a
government that brings together all the disparate interests of society and 
creates laws that further the general good, avoid corruption, and protect 
the rights of individuals.
II. THE COLLECTIVE CONGRESS IN THE CONSTITUTION
Reflecting the principles discussed above, the Constitution vests the 
legislative power in a collective Congress, a concept I introduced and 
explored in an earlier article.112 Collective lawmaking is a fundamental 
feature of the U.S. Constitution and collectivity serves the values of 
                                                                                                                     
108. MADISON, supra note 77, at 76 (referring to Madison’s statement).
109. Id. at 77 (referring to Madison’s statement).
110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 11, at 304 (James Madison). If the assembly grew 
too large “the soul that animates it, will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the 
fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.” Id.
111. For example, the possibility of a divergence of interests between the people and 
Congress was one justification for a separately elected President. See MADISON, supra note 77, at 
360 (referring to Morris’s statement).
112. See Rao, supra note 9, at 1491–95, 1506.
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republican government by promoting the general good, mediating 
factional interests, and separating power. These values protect individual 
liberty by encouraging (though not guaranteeing) laws that benefit every 
individual and by frustrating the pursuit of particular or narrow interests. 
This Part closely analyzes the collective Congress in the text of the
Constitution. Collective lawmaking was necessary to republican 
government, but not sufficient. The Framers carefully specified the 
proper relationship between the people and the federal government. 
Importantly, they created a double exclusivity of legislative power, 
vesting legislative power exclusively with Congress and allowing 
Congress to exercise only legislative powers. The Constitution’s 
references to “Congress” reinforce that, as an institution, Congress 
exercises only legislative powers. Moreover, Congress’s powers and 
limitations closely connect to the general good and the prevention of 
narrow factional interests. 
A. Creation of a Collective Congress 
The Constitution creates a particular type of collective legislature that 
maintains the integrity and exclusivity of the lawmaking power by 
insulating Congress from law execution and adjudication. The 
Constitution’s Preamble invokes the political theory discussed in the 
previous Part and expresses the creation of a government for all of the 
people.113 The people “do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.”114 The people together create the political 
entity for their collective benefit: “to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”115 The Preamble invokes the 
common enterprise of creating a government—a union of the people who 
together provide for their common defense and general welfare. 
Article I establishes how the people form this union. First, the 
Constitution creates limited federal lawmaking power. The Vesting 
Clause of Article I provides: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
                                                                                                                     
113. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 444 (J. Brown & C.C. Little eds., 2d ed. 1851) (noting that the Preamble reflects the 
intention of the Framers); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 28 (2008) (“The Preamble states the purposes of the instrument,
or rather of the decision to make the instrument law, in terms most of which seem oriented toward 
human good broadly conceived rather than toward institutional goals narrowly defined.”).
114. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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Senate and House of Representatives.”116 Following the political theory 
of the Framers, it is no accident that the legislative power comes first. 
The lawmaking power within Congress forms the social contract by 
creating and maintaining an institution that can collect the will of the 
people and enact laws for the public good. The vesting of the legislative 
power in a representative Congress fundamentally reaffirms the 
commitment to republican government. As Locke, Montesquieu, and 
Rousseau all emphasized, the lawmaking power must be given to 
collective bodies of men who will make laws for the political society that
bring together the different interests of the nation.117
The term congress means a coming together to represent distinct 
interests.118 It derives from the Latin word congredi or congressus,
meaning to meet with.119 The Continental Congress initially reflected the 
strong federal nature of the government under the Articles of 
Confederation, wherein the States came together to represent their 
particular interests and settle their affairs, similar to a meeting of separate 
sovereigns.120 At the Convention, the Framers did not debate the use of 
the term Congress, but continued with its use.121
The Framers quite consciously, however, did not call the federal 
legislature “parliament.” In England, Parliament was sovereign,122
whereas the Constitution recognized that sovereignty resided in the 
people, who delegated certain limited powers to the federal 
government.123 Moreover, Parliament included all the powers of the 
                                                                                                                     
116. Id. art. I, § 1.
117. See supra Section I.A.
118. Samuel Johnson defines Congress as “[a] meeting; a shock; a conflict; 2. An appointed 
meeting for settlement of affairs between different nations.” Congress, A DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785). Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary defines Congress as “1. A 
meeting of individuals; an assembly of envoys, commissioners, deputies, &c., particularly a 
meeting of the representatives of several courts, to concert measures for their common good, or 
to adjust their mutual concerns.” Congress, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828). The modern definition remains mostly unchanged. Congress, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39158?rskey=Cgpbl3&result=1&is
Advanced=false#eid (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (defining “Congress” as “[a] formal meeting or 
assembly of delegates or representatives for the discussion or settlement of some question”).
119. Congress, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
39158?rskey=Cgpbl3&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
120. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25 (2005).
121. See id. at 57.
122. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 156 (1765)
(“The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, 
that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.”).
123. See AMAR, supra note 120, at 179 (“In America, the bedrock principle was not 
legislative supremacy but popular sovereignty.”); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 280 (1985) (arguing that the 
Constitution “implied that the source of sovereignty was the people of the states”); Henry Paul 
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government—the executive, the judicial, and the legislative.124 By 
contrast, the American Congress was vested with only enumerated 
legislative powers and was specifically excluded from exercising 
executive or judicial powers. 
Under the Vesting Clause of Article I, Congress possesses all the 
legislative power of the federal government and no legislative power is 
vested in any other department. The Constitution makes Congress the 
exclusive recipient of “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.”125 This 
exclusivity means that the federal legislative powers may be exercised 
only by Congress and not by any other government actor.126 This
exclusivity runs in two directions. First, under the Vesting Clause, only 
Congress possesses legislative power. Second, the other references to 
Congress within the Constitution reinforce that Congress can exercise 
only legislative power. Although the two houses of Congress have some 
separate non-legislative powers,127 Congress as an institution exercises 
only legislative power. 
One point to clarify, however, is that Congress possesses some 
foreign affairs powers that were traditionally considered executive, or in 
Locke’s term, “federative,” such as the power to declare war and to grant 
letters of marque and reprisal.128 These powers, however, are not powers 
to execute or to enforce the laws. Rather, they pertain to foreign affairs 
and the exercise of sovereignty. Although some scholars have argued that 
foreign affairs powers were associated with the “executive power” 
during the eighteenth century,129 there was no essential connection 
between foreign affairs and executive power.130 Moreover, the foreign
                                                                                                                     
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 138 (1996).
124. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, at 149, 156 (Parliament possessed “absolute 
despotic power” and consisted of “the king’s majesty . . . the three estates of the realm; the lords 
spiritual, the lords temporal (who sit, together with the king, in one house), and the commons, 
who sit by themselves in another”).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
126. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002). 
But cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004) (explaining the difference between the 
nondelegation doctrine, that Congress cannot delegate legislative power, and the exclusive 
delegation principle, that only Congress can delegate legislative power, and advocating for the 
exclusive delegation interpretation).
127. See infra notes 207–40 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
129. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 272 (2001) (“[The Framers] understood . . . that the phrase ‘executive 
power’ would include foreign affairs powers unless otherwise qualified by particular language.”).
130. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 560–71 (2004). Theorists such as Locke and Montesquieu 
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affairs power was also recognized as distinct from domestic execution of 
the laws.131 The external execution of the foreign affairs power or 
federative power was usually linked to the executive. Conferring some 
of this foreign affairs power to Congress does not suggest, however, that
Congress has any share of the domestic law execution or enforcement
power that would be associated with the “executive power.” Congress 
does not execute the law, even with respect to its foreign affairs powers. 
For instance, it can declare, but not wage, war.132 Its powers are limited 
to regulating aspects of foreign affairs and delineating the rules for the 
exercise of the foreign affairs power.133 These powers do not undermine 
the exclusivity of the legislative power.
The text of the Constitution consistently refers to “Congress” or “the 
Congress”134 as the collective lawmaking institution of the federal 
government acting as a singular entity. In addition to the Article I, 
Section 8, powers discussed in the next Section, the other powers of 
Congress are also exclusively legislative, allowing Congress to set out 
rules, regulations, and prohibitions in various contexts. Consider the 
following: 
“the Migration or Importation of such Persons as any 
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall 
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight;”135
the Emoluments Clause provides that government 
officials cannot accept any “present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign 
State” “without the Consent of the Congress;”136
“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors;”137
                                                                                                                     
“provide no more than weak support for the idea that foreign relations powers are inherently 
executive in nature.” Id.
131. See id. at 560–64.
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
133. Id. art. I, §§ 1, 8, 10. 
134. The Vesting Clause of Article I is the only place where the Constitution uses the 
indefinite article to refer to “a Congress” and “a Senate and House of Representatives.” Id. art. I,
§ 1.
135. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
136. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
137. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
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“the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the 
President and Vice President;”138
“the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments;”139
“in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish;”140
“with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make;”141
“but when not committed within any State, the Trial 
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law 
have directed;”142
“The Congress shall have Power to declare the 
Punishment of Treason;”143
“And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof;”144
 “New States may be admitted by the Congress into 
this Union . . .”; and no state may be formed or erected 
“without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States 
concerned as well as of the Congress;”145
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;”146
“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses 
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this 
Constitution . . . or the other Mode of Ratification may be 
proposed by the Congress;”147
                                                                                                                     
138. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
139. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
140. Id. art. III, § 1.
141. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
142. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
143. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
144. Id. art. IV, § 1.
145. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
146. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
147. Id. art. V.
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“The Congress and the several States shall have 
concurrent power to enforce this article;”148
“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
year . . . ” and “the Congress may by law provide for the case 
wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect 
shall have qualified;”149
“The Congress may by law provide for the case of the 
death of any of the persons from whom the House of 
Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of 
choice shall have devolved upon them;”150
The Congress has power to “enforce” by “appropriate 
legislation” a number of amendments.151
In these varied contexts, Congress’s powers pertain to lawmaking 
authority. The Constitution reinforces this by consistently using the 
language of lawmaking, that Congress shall “by law” or “by appropriate 
legislation” “enforce” or “declare” or “consent.” The above list is also 
notable for what it excludes. Congress has no power to execute or to 
adjudicate the law. Each of these powers relates to setting general, 
prospective rules. Congress has power to act within a variety of contexts, 
but it always acts as the lawmaking and regulating body of the federal 
government. 
Moreover, the Constitution uses the definite article “the Congress” in 
almost every reference, which reinforces the singular national Congress 
acting in a legislative capacity.152 Congress is an “it” not a “they” when 
exercising the legislative power of the federal government.153 There are 
only a few clauses in which no article precedes the reference to 
Congress.154 This difference, however, appears stylistic because similar 
                                                                                                                     
148. Id. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933).
149. Id. amend. XX, §§ 2–3.
150. Id. amend. XX, § 4.
151. Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XVIII, § 2
(repealed 1933); id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
152. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
153. Compare Rao, supra note 9, at 1465–67, with Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a 
“They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244–49
(1992) (asserting that congressional outcomes often differ from what any individual legislator 
desires).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (creating as the seat of the federal government a district 
“as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the 
Government of the United States”); id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”); id. amend. 
XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce . . . .”); id. amend. XIX (“Congress shall have 
power to enforce this article . . . .”).
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clauses will use “the Congress” or simply “Congress” with no apparent 
distinction in meaning. For example, Article I, Section 10 places 
limitations on states to act without the consent of Congress.155 Clause 2 
states, “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”156 Yet in the same Section 
in a parallel formulation, Clause 3 states, “No State shall, without the 
Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of 
War in time of Peace . . . .”157 These adjoining clauses, which are similar
in structure and purpose, use the Congress and Congress
interchangeably. Congress and the Congress mean the same thing in a 
Constitution with one federal lawmaking body.158
The Constitution’s reference to state legislatures,159 however, also 
speaks to the meaning of “legislative power.” These legislatures take
different forms and exercise various powers under their respective state 
constitutions; nonetheless state legislature refers “solely and exclusively 
to a state’s general lawmaking body comprised of elected 
representatives.”160 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that at the time of 
                                                                                                                     
155. Id. art. I, § 10. 
156. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
157. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
158. In other constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the definite article 
to have significance. For example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, in a concurring opinion Justice
Antonin Scalia argued that “the Recess” referred only to intersession recesses, and not the shorter 
breaks within a legislative session also called recesses. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2595 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). But cf. id. at 2564 (majority opinion) (holding that “the Recess” could refer to inter-
or intra-session recesses in part because of a longstanding historical practice between the President 
and the Senate).
In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Justice Scalia opined that the “the Courts 
of law” in the Appointments Clause referred only to the federal courts created by the Constitution 
and vested with the judicial power. 501 U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“The Clause does not refer generally to ‘Bodies exercising judicial 
Functions,’ or even to ‘Courts’ generally . . . . It refers to ‘the Courts of Law.’ Certainly this does 
not mean any ‘Court[] of Law’ (the Supreme Court of Rhode Island would not do). The definite 
article ‘the’ obviously narrows the class of eligible ‘Courts of Law’ to those courts of law 
envisioned by the Constitution. Those are Article III courts, and the Tax Court is not one of 
them.”). The Court held that the definite article designated the federal courts, as opposed to state
courts, executive branch courts, or other courts. Id. Unlike in these contexts, “Congress” has only 
one meaning within the Constitution—it is the bicameral lawmaking body of the federal 
government. 
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof.”); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2692 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the appendix compiling all references to 
“legislature” in the Constitution).
160. Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections 
Clause, 109 NW. L. REV. 847, 863 (2015). The Supreme Court recently addressed the meaning of 
“legislature” in the Elections Clause in a case challenging the constitutionality of the Arizona 
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the Founding, “[a] Legislature was then the representative body which 
made the laws of the people. The term is often used in the Constitution 
with this evident meaning.”161 The Constitution created Congress as a 
particular type of legislature, but state legislatures were similarly
understood to be representative, collective, lawmaking institutions.162
The Constitution confines the legislative power within Congress 
through several other mechanisms. The Constitution does not vest any 
legislative powers in either the executive or the judiciary. Even in areas 
in which the executive enjoys significant power, such as foreign 
relations, it lacks any power to make laws.163 The Constitution does not 
vest Congress with any power to delegate its legislative power.164
Finally, the Constitution not only creates a legislative power, but it
also requires that “[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
Year.”165 This follows the reasoning of Locke and others that the ongoing 
existence and availability of the collective legislative power provides the
foundation for the rule of law. The President cannot dissolve or suspend 
Congress, only adjourn the two houses to a specific date in the case of 
their disagreement.166 Even this limited presidential power was subject 
                                                                                                                     
Independent Redistricting Commission. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668. Although the 
majority allowed the people of Arizona to create a redistricting commission by referendum, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion argues that an independent commission cannot exercise the 
constitutional powers of the state legislature. Id. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissent 
is more consistent with the text and structure of the Constitution and the importance of collective 
decisionmaking by representative legislatures. The Chief Justice notes that every reference in the 
Constitution to a state legislature “is consistent with the understanding of a legislature as a 
representative body. More importantly, many of them are only consistent with an institutional 
legislature . . . .” Id. at 2680 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
161. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1920). “Legislatures” in Article V “was 
not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution . . . . A Legislature was 
then the representative body which made the laws of the people. The term is often used in the 
Constitution with this evident meaning . . . . When [the Framers] intended that direct action by the 
people should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such 
purpose. The members of the House of Representatives were required to be chosen by the people 
of the several states.” Id.
162. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2680 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
163. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the 
framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”).
164. See generally Lawson, supra note 126 (discussing the history of the nondelegation 
doctrine).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
166. Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President may] on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, 
or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of 
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”). 
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to serious debate and apparently has not been exercised in American 
history.167
The Constitution creates a particular type of collective legislature,
ensuring that all of the legislative powers of the national government vest 
in Congress. The text also reinforces the double exclusivity of the 
legislative power: only Congress can exercise lawmaking power and 
Congress can exercise only lawmaking power.
B. Promoting the General Good Through Congressional
Powers and Limits 
The Constitution vests the collective Congress with enumerated 
powers and also specifies important limitations on the legislative power.
These powers and limitations reinforce values served by collective 
lawmaking, including promotion of the general good and frustration of
narrow or factional interests. This Section closely examines the powers 
and limitations of Congress and identifies how the Constitution connects 
lawmaking and the general good and prohibits a variety of legislative 
actions that would allow Congress to favor particular individuals, groups, 
or states.168
The Constitution vests Congress with specific, enumerated powers to
exercise collectively. Linked by an emphasis on subjects of general 
concern, the enumerated powers implicitly and, in some clauses 
explicitly, require generality and uniformity. This goes to the nature of 
the legislative power, which the Framers understood to require equal 
application to citizens without exemption or favor. The powers in Section 
8 taken together emphasize the general good and provide further 
evidence about generality as a hallmark of the legitimate exercise of 
legislative power.169
The first conferred power echoes the Preamble and allows Congress 
to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” to “provide for 
the common Defence and general welfare of the United States” and “all 
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through the United 
                                                                                                                     
167. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 413 (2015).
168. Accordingly, this Section draws on the originalist and clause-based scholarship of 
others, as an independent inquiry into each of these clauses is beyond the scope of this project.
169. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated . . . .”); see, e.g., Amar, supra note 10, at 751 (discussing 
Section 8 as a whole); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 150 (2010) (“[T]he theory of 
collective action federalism reads Section 8 as a unified whole, like a well-written paragraph. 
Clause 1 is the topic sentence that expresses the unifying principle of a federal government 
empowered to promote the general welfare.”).
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States.”170 The first of the enumerated powers includes taxing, but only 
for the general welfare. The early Congresses seriously debated whether 
spending on items like internal improvements were for the “general 
welfare.”171 The requirement of generality functioned as an important 
limitation on the exercise of federal power and spending. As Robert 
Natelson explained, the Clause implemented a “fiduciary-style
impartiality,” requiring revenues to be spent only on projects of general 
benefit.172
The Commerce Clause uses the term “to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States.”173 As Randy Barnett has
demonstrated, the original meaning of regulate was to make regular.174
Throughout the debates on the Constitution, the Framers used regulate
to mean to subject to a rule or to regularize.175 The term regulate refers 
to a kind of uniformity—specifying how certain activity should take 
place. Although of course there has been substantial debate about the 
scope of “commerce,”176 the Constitution confers a power to regularize
commerce, meaning to create general rules for commerce between the 
states or with foreign governments.177
Congress has power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” 
and “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”178 The Supreme Court has interpreted the uniformity 
requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause as prohibiting private bills on 
                                                                                                                     
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
171. See John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP.
L. REV. 63, 72 (2001) (explaining the original meaning of “general” was for the national welfare, 
not regional or local welfare, and as a limitation on the federal spending power).
172. See Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay 
in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 53 (2003).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
174. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 139 (2001).
175. Id. at 142.
176. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 601 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (defending the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act with an expansive view of “commerce” based on 
practical considerations and experience); id. at 659–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for an 
original and narrower interpretation of “commerce” noting that “Article I contains no whatever-
it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power”). Compare Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial 
Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing 
a broad commerce definition), with Barnett, supra note 174 (arguing for a narrower commerce 
definition), and Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1987) (arguing for a narrower commerce definition).
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
178. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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bankruptcy.179 In a detailed study of the Constitution’s uniformity 
requirements, Judith Koffler concluded that the Supreme Court has 
applied different standards of uniformity across clauses.180 The 
uniformity requirement has sometimes been interpreted to mean without 
preference across the states; but has not been interpreted to mean that 
taxes must be uniform across individuals.181
Other clauses similarly include a generality or uniformity 
requirement. For example, Congress has power “[t]o coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures.”182 Regulating the value of coined money 
promotes a uniform standard throughout the nation and also allows 
Congress to set the value of foreign money across the nation. Fixing the 
standard of weights and measures similarly provides for a settled uniform 
rule declared in law and applicable across the nation. 
The foreign affairs powers in Clauses 10 through 16 give Congress 
power to regulate the armed forces and other aspects of national 
sovereignty.183 Defining and punishing “Offences against the Law of 
Nations” allows Congress to codify and provide a uniform national 
definition for international law crimes.184
In the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress may prescribe the 
manner of proving state records and proceedings by “general Laws.”185
Several clauses of Article I require uniform Laws, but this is the only 
place where the Constitution uses the term general Laws. There is very 
little historical evidence about what general Laws means or how it affects 
Congress’s power to legislate under Article IV.186
Congress’s enumerated powers reinforce the shared characteristics of 
good laws, namely their general applicability and impartiality. On the 
flip side, the specific restrictions on Congress in Article I, Section 9, 
reinforce that Congress cannot legislate for narrow or particular 
                                                                                                                     
179. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (holding that a statute 
that provided relief to only one bankrupt railroad violated the uniformity provision of the 
Bankruptcy Clause); id. at 472 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement was drafted 
in order to prohibit Congress from enacting private bankruptcy laws.”).
180. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination 
of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 77 (1983).
181. Id. at 77–78.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
183. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–16.
184. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the 
Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1675 (2012) (developing the 
original meaning of the Offenses Clause).
185. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
186. See Julie L. B. Johnson, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’s 
Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1614 (1997) (noting the lack of research).
42
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss1/1
2018] WHY CONGRESS MATTERS 43
matters.187 Even in a government of limited and enumerated powers, the 
Framers considered these limits important enough to specify. These 
prohibitions share a common characteristic: they all pertain to the 
exercise of legislative power over particular, rather than general, matters.
For example, Congress could not prohibit the migration or 
importation of people that the States wanted to admit until 1808, but they 
could be taxed up to ten dollars per person.188 This limited Congress from 
taking specific actions against southern states and their slaveholding 
citizens. The prohibition on bills of attainder prevents Congress from 
making a judicial determination by legislation.189 This reinforces 
separation between the legislative and judicial powers and prevents 
Congress from using the legislative process to render judgment against a 
particular person in a particular case.190 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bank Markazi v. Peterson,191 however, substantially narrowed the 
limitation on bills of attainder.192
Similarly, the prohibition on ex post facto laws prevents Congress 
from enacting laws that have retroactive effect.193 Unlike prospective 
legislation with general applicability, backward looking laws can target 
a specific group, allowing lawmakers to know who will be affected.194
At the Convention, Ellsworth noted: “there was no lawyer, no civilian 
who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It 
can not then be necessary to prohibit them.”195 Nonetheless, the 
Constitution includes the traditional prohibition on ex post facto laws 
                                                                                                                     
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
188. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
189. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
190. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the 
Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 366 (1962) (“[T]he clause was intended as a broad 
implementation of the separation of powers . . . designed to limit the legislature in much the same 
way as the case and controversy requirement of article III limits the judiciary.”).
191. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (upholding a statute that directed a particular set of assets to be 
made available for post-judgment execution to satisfy past judgments against a separation of 
powers challenge because the statute did not formally direct the courts to decide a case in favor 
of a certain party). But cf. id. at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute violates 
separation of powers and intrudes on the power of the judiciary because “Congress has decided 
this case by enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties’ specific legal 
disputes to guarantee respondents victory”).
192. Id.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
194. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (“The Legislature’s
unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without 
individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be 
tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or 
individuals.”).
195. MADISON, supra note 77, at 510. 
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precisely because such laws—by definition—change the rights of 
particular persons or entities and are contrary to the nature of the 
legislative power. 
The other restrictions in Article I, Section 9, similarly prohibit a 
variety of discriminatory laws. For instance, capitation and other direct 
taxes must be in “proportion to the Census or Enumeration.”196 Such 
taxes must be proportional and therefore uniform based on the number 
of individuals under the census. Congress cannot impose a tax or duty on 
articles exported from any state,197 which protects state trade and also 
prevents taxes or duties that would discriminate between states. The Port 
Preference Clause requires Congress treat the regulation of commerce 
equally across all ports and that vessels from one state to another need 
not pay duties,198 which prevents the imposition of trade laws that favor 
one state or industry over others. The United States cannot grant titles of 
nobility,199 a restriction on all departments of the federal government, 
and against drawing distinctions between citizens, who are equal before 
the law.
Congress’s powers promote generality and its restrictions prohibit a 
variety of laws that would target or benefit specific individuals or groups. 
While the Constitution does not, and by its nature cannot, specify what 
makes a law serve the general good, its legislative powers and restrictions 
together reinforce the importance of legislating impartially and for the 
general good. Political choices will at times result in laws that confer 
special benefits. Such laws are not for that reason unconstitutional. 
Nonetheless, generality provides an important value and guiding 
principle for the legitimate exercise of legislative power.
III. COMPONENTS OF THE COLLECTIVE CONGRESS: HOUSE, SENATE,
AND MEMBERS
The Constitution creates a collective Congress, but it also carefully 
specifies the structure, powers, and limits for the two branches of 
Congress and for individual senators and representatives. This Part 
analyzes how the components of Congress support the collective 
legislative power and reinforce its exclusivity within Congress. 
Moreover, the internal structure of Congress reflects values promoted by 
collective decisionmaking, such as the minimization of factional 
influence, the fiduciary duty of members to the people, and the enactment 
of laws that promote the general good. 
                                                                                                                     
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
197. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
198. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
199. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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A. Two Houses of Congress
The Constitution creates a bicameral Congress and provides the 
House and Senate with separate institutional dignity, but with no separate 
legislative powers.200 This Section focuses on how the one-house powers 
of the House and Senate, which are not legislative, reinforce the 
exclusivity of legislative power in Congress as a whole.
The bicameral structure of Congress serves a number of familiar 
values and purposes. Fundamentally, this structure creates different 
levels of representation. The House of Representatives provides a direct 
and immediate connection to the people through popular election every 
two years.201 Originally selected by state legislatures, the Senate provides 
for equal representation of each state.202 The Senate also serves as an 
upper chamber with more statesmanlike views as reflected in longer,
staggered, six-year terms. The debates and concerns leading to the Great 
Compromise are well documented, but there was also widespread 
agreement about bicameralism as a mechanism for expanding the range 
of representation and ensuring that different perspectives would be 
reflected in legislation.203
With a bicameral legislature, lawmaking requires separate 
deliberation in the House and Senate and agreement between the two 
branches before presentment to the President. Article I, Section 7,
reinforces that all bills and “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which 
the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)”204 must be presented 
to the President for his approval.
Bicameralism provides an internal check within Congress that
ensures each branch restrains the other. As James Wilson argued, “If the 
Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor 
stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into 
distinct and independent branches.”205 The two branches represent 
different constituencies and therefore have somewhat different interests, 
further reinforcing the checking mechanism.206 Bicameralism raises the 
                                                                                                                     
200. Id. art. I, § 1; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
202. Id. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of senators).
203. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 158–59 (1937) (noting little 
disagreement at the Convention with regard to a bicameral Congress).
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
205. MADISON, supra note 77, at 126–27; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 11
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against the adoption of a unicameral legislature).
206. MADISON, supra note 77, at 233–34 (discussing the need for the Senate to have 
independence and life tenure because the Senate must check the democratic branch). “[T]he 
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cost of legislating and checks factionalism, promoting legislation aimed 
at the general good and with due regard for the multitude of interests in 
society.207
The two branches of Congress play an equal role in the enactment of 
legislation; however, the Constitution also provides each house with 
several distinct institutional powers that are not legislative. The powers 
given to each house highlight what is distinctive about the legislative 
power, which must be exercised through bicameral passage and 
presentment. As the Supreme Court explained in INS v. Chadha,208
These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and 
bicameralism underscore the difference between the 
legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but 
important one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. 
These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately 
justified . . . .209
The exceptions to bicameralism are all “separately justified” and
distinct from the legislative power.210 For instance, the one-house powers 
have no binding legal effect without an action by the other house or the 
President. Consider the impeachment and removal powers. The House 
has “the sole Power of Impeachment”211 and the Senate has “the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments.”212 The Framers recognized that the 
impeachment power and the power to judge impeachments could have 
been vested in other institutions, including the courts or a specialized 
committee selected for that purpose.213 They debated the correct 
placement, but eventually chose to vest this power in Congress. The 
House would represent the people in bringing impeachments and the 
Senate would have the fortitude and sufficient size (compared to the 
courts) to remove high-ranking officials.214
                                                                                                                     
checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest must be 
opposed to another interest.” Id. at 233.
207. See STORY, supra note 113, at 202. Bicameralism “operates indirectly as a preventive 
to attempts to carry private, personal, or party objects, not connected with the common good.” Id.
208. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
209. Id. at 956.
210. Id.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
212. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
213. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 500 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
214. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 11, at 339 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton 
argues that the Senate is the proper body to try impeachments because “[w]hat other body would 
be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, 
the necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, 
his accusers?” Id.; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233–35 (1993) (explaining the 
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The text and structure of the impeachment and removal powers 
suggest that the House and the Senate are playing something other than 
their usual legislative role. The impeachment and removal powers are 
located in clauses that pertain to the selection of the leadership of each 
house, not enumerated with the lawmaking powers of Article I, Section
8. Both the selection of leadership and impeachment turn on the political 
discretion and judgment of each house,215 unencumbered by either the 
other house of Congress or the President. These are discretionary 
political judgments not reviewable by either the President or the 
courts.216 The impeachment and removal powers do not establish general 
rules for the public, but rather perform a distinct function of holding 
high-ranking officials and judges accountable for their actions.
When sitting for the purpose of trying impeachments, senators “shall 
be on Oath or Affirmation.”217 All senators, however, already take an 
Oath or Affirmation under Article VI to uphold the Constitution.218 The 
additional oath suggests a separation between their ordinary legislative 
powers and the power to try impeachments, the latter more akin to a 
judicial determination. The Senate’s trial of impeachments also includes 
a supermajority vote of two-thirds of the “Members present.”219 The 
impeachment and removal powers work in tandem—an official is
removed only upon the action of both houses.
Similarly, the Senate has the power to provide advice and consent for 
the officers, judges, and other officials nominated by the President.220
The President, however, has the sole power of appointment, and even 
after confirmation by the Senate, the President has the sole power to 
commission officers.221 Thus, although it serves as an important 
                                                                                                                     
historical background of vesting the power to try impeachments in the Senate); RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 5 (1973).
215. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 11, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton). The 
jurisdiction and acts of impeachment “are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.” Id.
216. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230 (explaining that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial 
Clause “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review”); 
CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 57 (1974) (arguing that judicial review of 
impeachment would be inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
218. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
219. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
220. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of 
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”).
221. Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 6 (The President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United 
States.”).
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safeguard, the Senate’s advice and consent power is not a legislative act.
It has legal effect only when the President initiates a nomination.222
The Senate’s role in the ratification of treaties depends on the 
President’s power to “make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”223 The treaty power also was not considered an aspect 
of legislative power; rather, treaties are acts of sovereignty shared by the 
President and the Senate.224 As Hamilton explains, “The essence of the 
legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules 
for the regulation of the society.”225 As for the treaty power, “[i]ts objects 
are, CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but 
derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed 
by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and 
sovereign.”226 The Senate’s role in treaty ratification pertains not to the 
collective legislative power, but instead to the distinct power over the 
regulation of foreign relations shared with the President.227
There are only two actions that each house may exercise and complete 
independently without the involvement of the other house or the 
President. First, each house of Congress has the power to determine “the 
Rules of its Proceedings,”228 which allows the House and Senate to 
manage their internal organization and rules for the orderly passage of 
legislation. This power was understood as essential to the legislative 
power.229 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the authority of 
                                                                                                                     
222. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing 
the advice and consent power and noting “[t]here will of course be no exertion of choice, on the 
part of the senate. They may defeat one choice of the executive, and oblige him to make another; 
but they cannot themselves choose . . . they can only ratify or reject the choice he may have 
made”).
223. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
224. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 11, at 335 (John Jay) (“All constitutional acts 
of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and 
obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature . . . . It surely does not follow, that because 
they have given the power of making laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise 
give them power to do every other act of sovereignty, by which the citizens are to be bound and 
affected.”).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 11, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton).
226. Id. at 389; see also 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 514 (1891) (James Madison) (“The object of 
treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external.”).
227. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2103–08 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (discussing the original meaning of the Treaty Clause and concluding that the 
Treaty Power “can be used to arrange intercourse with other nations, but not to regulate purely 
domestic affairs”). 
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
229. STORY, supra note 113, at 579 (“No person can doubt the propriety of the provision 
authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did not exist, 
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each branch of Congress to determine its schedule and rules of 
proceeding, so long as there is “a reasonable relation between the mode 
or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is 
sought to be attained” and the rule does not “ignore constitutional 
restraints or violate fundamental rights.”230 The Court recently explained
that “[w]e generally take at face value the Senate’s own report of its 
actions,” including when it is in session or as to the existence of a quorum 
reflected in the Journal.231
Second, Article I, Section 5, provides: “Each House shall be the Judge 
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”232
Each house also has the authority to “punish its Members for disorderly 
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”
Exclusion and expulsion are actions that each house can complete 
independently. Senators and representatives are “judged” only by their 
fellow senators and representatives respectively, and therefore not by the 
courts or the executive, as to whether they meet the qualifications 
established in the Constitution or should be expelled for “disorderly 
Behaviour.”233 These provisions establish accountability for each 
member to his house of Congress.
The rules of proceeding, punishment of members, and expulsion of 
members are the only powers that allow each chamber to complete a
unilateral action. These require no action by the President, as with 
appointments and treaty making, and no concurrence of the other 
chamber, as for the impeachment and removal of high-ranking 
officials.234 These are the only subjects on which one chamber can “serve 
in both a ‘legislative’ and an ‘executive’ capacity, creating and enforcing 
rules to govern their internal chamber affairs.”235
                                                                                                                     
it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with 
decency, deliberation, and order.”).
230. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892); see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 
495 U.S. 385, 410 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Mutual regard between the coordinate 
branches, and the interest of certainty, both demand that official representations regarding such 
matters of internal process be accepted at face value.”).
231. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2574–75 (2014).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
233. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) 
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 607 (2014).
235. Grove & Devins, supra note 234, at 583. These powers are also “the textual source of 
each chamber’s investigative authority—a power that has enabled each house to conduct inquiries 
into executive wrongdoing. The House and the Senate act separately and independently when 
conducting such investigations—each pursuing matters of interest to its chamber.” Id. at 608 
(footnotes omitted). Each house has an independent power and authority to investigate the 
executive. Id.; see also Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
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As the Court carefully explained in Chadha, the unicameral powers 
and functions of the House and Senate are not legislative and have 
distinct justifications from the legislative power.236 In addition, none of 
these unicameral actions allow one house of Congress to execute or to 
adjudicate the laws.237 The unicameral powers reconfirm the centrality 
of the collective Congress for exercising the legislative power and the 
role of the House and Senate as institutional components of that 
collective power.
B. Members of the Collective Congress
This Section develops how the Constitution creates the collective 
Congress with “senators” and “representatives” who have specific 
requirements for representation, limited privileges in connection with 
exercising the legislative power, and complete restrictions from 
exercising anything other than the legislative power. The Constitution’s 
references to “senators,” “representatives,” and “members” reinforce 
their importance as parts of the collective Congress. Members of 
Congress have only a partial power, which is to enact laws together with 
a majority of their colleagues. The Constitution grants members of 
Congress no individual powers as legislators. As the Supreme Court 
noted,
The two houses of congress are legislative bodies 
representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any 
one individual, but in the aggregate of the members who 
compose the body, and its action is not the action of any 
separate member or number of members, but the action of 
the body as a whole . . . .238
The power and dignity of members flows from their offices, which 
are parts of the collective Congress.
The powers and limitations of members reinforce both the collective 
Congress and legislative exclusivity: members have only one part of the 
collective lawmaking power and members can exercise exclusively 
legislative powers, not executive or judicial powers. In addition, the 
powers and limitations of members also reinforce the fiduciary duty of 
members to the people, the independence of members from the other 
departments, and the integrity of the legislative power as a process for 
the general, not particular, good.
                                                                                                                     
1083, 1143 (2009) (discussing “Congress’s ability to hold executive branch officers in 
contempt”).
236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983).
237. Id. at 955.
238. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss1/1
2018] WHY CONGRESS MATTERS 51
1. Election, Representation, Organization
Representatives and senators are the components of Congress and the 
connection between the people and the legislative power. The 
Constitution carefully establishes this fiduciary relationship in a manner 
that preserves the integrity and independence of members, while 
restricting them to only a partial legislative power. The Framers debated 
at great length the size and form of representation that would best 
encourage Congress to collectively pursue the general good.239 The 
Constitution’s job descriptions for members reinforces the essential 
features of the collective Congress.
The Constitution delineates distinct age, citizenship, and residency 
qualifications for representatives and senators.240 The specification of 
qualifications in the Constitution provides a safeguard against self-
dealing. Madison explained that since representatives could have “a
personal interest distinct from that of their Constituents” the 
qualifications of electors and elected “were fundamental articles in a 
Republican Gov't and ought to be fixed by the Constitution,” not left to 
a self-interested Legislature to regulate.241 The Supreme Court has held 
that the qualifications are exclusive and neither a single house, nor 
Congress as a whole, can impose additional qualifications on its 
members, because those qualifications are fixed in the Constitution.242
                                                                                                                     
239. 1 FARRAND, supra note 213, at 413.
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); id. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, 
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
241. MADISON, supra note 77, at 427 (“In all cases where the representatives of the people 
will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same reason for 
being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a 
common interest. . . . It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own 
privileges.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, supra note 11, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen . . . are defined and fixed in the 
Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.”); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521–
22 (1969) (providing a detailed history of the original and post-ratification meaning of the 
Qualifications Clause).
242. Powell, 395 U.S. at 548 (“[B]oth the intention of the Framers, to the extent it can be 
determined, and an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system persuade us that 
the Constitution does not vest in the Congress a discretionary power to deny membership by a 
majority vote.”). The Supreme Court has also held that states may not impose additional 
qualifications for representatives or senators in addition to those listed in the Constitution. U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (“In the absence of any constitutional 
delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, 
such a power does not exist.”). But see id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the 
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The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1992, 
placed a similar type of anti-self-dealing restriction on members of 
Congress, requiring that legislated changes in compensation should not 
take effect until after an election of representatives.243
Senators and representatives receive “a Compensation for their 
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States.”244 Congress may set the compensation for its members 
by enacting legislation, which like other laws would be subject to the 
President’s veto. Yet the Treasury must pay such compensation, placing 
it outside the discretion of the President or any executive officer.245 The 
President cannot check the service of individual members of Congress 
by withholding their pay. This guarantees members’ independence from 
the President for the payment for their public service. Moreover, the 
President lacks any powers of removal or discipline over members of 
Congress—these are left exclusively to each house to judge its own 
members.246 The President’s veto provides a check on the collective 
legislative power of Congress, but he has no checks on the individual 
members of Congress. 
The Constitution also requires “Senators and Representatives,” along 
with other state and federal officials, to be “bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”247 The oath applies to 
members of Congress individually in the discharge of their offices. These 
protections and requirements ensure the integrity of the offices held by 
individual members.
The Constitution provides a simple framework for the organization 
and leadership of the House and Senate, leaving most of the details to be 
determined by each chamber. Each chamber has the exclusive power to 
choose its leader—the Speaker of the House and the President pro 
tempore of the Senate respectively—as well as other congressional 
officers.248 But, unlike the unitary executive and even the judiciary, 
                                                                                                                     
Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements 
for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. . . . [W]here the Constitution is silent, 
it raises no bar to action by the States or the people.”).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the services of the 
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have 
intervened.”).
244. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text.
247. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
248. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other 
Officers . . . .”); id. § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President 
pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of 
President of the United States.”).
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which is headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,249 there is no 
singular head of Congress. Since the Constitution does not create 
congressional offices beyond the Speaker and President pro tempore, or 
specify their powers, each chamber may create the offices and functions 
it considers necessary and proper, providing the House and the Senate 
with control over their internal organization and leadership. The 
Constitution recognizes the need in a collective Congress for leadership 
and organizing offices to direct legislative work, but leaves such 
organization to be ascertained by the members of Congress.
Although the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of 
the Senate may be first among equals, these congressional leaders have 
no distinct constitutional powers or prerogatives, including no 
prerogative to their offices that stems from the people. Nor do they have 
a relationship to any other department of the government separate from 
the relationship of the House and the Senate as institutions and parts of 
Congress.250 The Speaker and President pro tempore lead, administer, 
and organize the business of their respective chambers, which can result 
in significant practical power and visibility, but they do not exercise any 
separate lawmaking powers. The Supreme Court, however, has 
recognized one potentially significant power for the Speaker of the 
House and the President of the Senate in the “enrolled bill doctrine,” 
which requires courts to accept the signatures of these officers as 
                                                                                                                     
249. The Constitution refers to the “Chief Justice,” not in Article III, but only in Article I, 
Section 3, Clause 6, “When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall 
preside . . . .” Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. The judiciary, of course, is not unitary like the executive, and 
the Chief Justice has no directive authority or control over how lower court judges exercise the 
judicial power.
250. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the only other place where these congressional 
officers are mentioned, and here they have the role of receiving the President’s resignation or 
statement of inability to serve. Id. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits 
to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the 
Vice President as Acting President.”); id. amend. XXV, § 4 (“Whenever the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President.”). The legislative history of the Amendment suggests that 
the specific officers were named so that a transmission could be made even if Congress was not 
in session. 111 CONG. REC. 3270 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). The role is also administrative, 
providing for the officers to receive the transmission of presidential disability, but not providing 
for the exercise of any other power in connection with the transmission.
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“complete and unimpeachable” evidence that a bill has been 
constitutionally enacted.251
The Constitution establishes representatives and senators as 
components of Congress who remain responsible to their constituents 
through regular elections. Yet members have no independent power, only 
the power and dignity of being one part of the whole. Even the leadership 
of the House and Senate possesses no separate constitutional powers or 
relationship with the other departments of the government. This 
reinforces the collective Congress within the constitutional structure by 
ensuring that members can exercise power only when acting together.
2. The Privilege of Speech and Debate
The Constitution provides a specific privilege for members of 
Congress that preserves the independence and integrity of each member, 
but within their duties as part of the collective Congress. Senators and 
representatives 
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of 
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance 
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in 
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.252
This language was drawn from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.253
The purpose of the Clause relates to the preservation of the independence 
of the legislature. 
These privileges attach to individual senators and representatives. 
The Speech and Debate Clause first specifies that except for the most 
serious crimes, members cannot be arrested. This is another mechanism 
for protecting the ability of Congress to convene and exercise the 
legislative power. The executive cannot stop the legislature from meeting
through trivial arrests.
                                                                                                                     
251. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. District Court, 
486 F.3d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming the rule of Field). There are reasons to question 
whether the enrolled-bill rule is consistent with the collective Congress. See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, 
Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO.
L.J. 323, 327 (2009). Bar-Siman-Tov argues that the doctrine is incompatible with the 
Constitution because, inter alia, it “amounts to an impermissible delegation of both judicial and 
lawmaking powers to the legislative officers of Congress” and “permits the exercise of lawmaking 
authority by just two individuals—the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate—
rather than by Congress as a whole, as mandated by the Constitution.” Id.
252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
253. BILL OF RIGHTS 1689, 1 W. & M. cl. 2 (Eng.) (“The freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament shall not be impeached.”).
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In addition, the Clause provides a privilege against answering for 
legislative speech or debate “in either House.” The Clause has not 
received significant scholarly attention, but Professor Josh Chafetz’s 
extended treatment suggests a broad reading of the Clause’s purposes.254
Others, however, have argued that the original meaning of the Clause 
relates to a relatively narrow privilege connected with official duties.255
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to apply only within the 
“legislative sphere.”256 Moreover, the covered legislative acts “must be 
an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by 
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with 
respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed 
legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places 
within the jurisdiction of either House.”257
Whatever its precise scope, the natural reading of the Clause 
emphasizes these privileges in the context of the collective legislative 
power. The privilege from arrest pertains to the attendance at a legislative 
session or going to and from those sessions.258 The privileged speech and 
debate are within “either House.” As Hamilton explained:
[I]t is essential to the freedom, and to the necessary 
independence of the deliberations of the body, that the 
members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts 
done in a collective capacity; and the security to the society 
must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust 
to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with 
fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to 
combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.259
The privilege pertains to members’ collective actions—it helps to 
maintain the integrity and independence of Congress as an institution and 
the deliberations within the House and Senate. It further aligns the 
                                                                                                                     
254. JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 110 (2007); see also Michael L. 
Shenkman, Talking About Speech or Debate: Revisiting Legislative Immunity, 32 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 351, 357–63 (2014).
255. Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or Debate Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or 
Non-Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 393 (2012) (arguing that the original meaning of 
the Clause confers only legislative immunity, but not an evidentiary privilege).
256. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972).
257. Id. at 625.
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
259. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, supra note 11, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added);
see also 2 JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (“In order to enable and encourage a 
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is 
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be 
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that 
liberty may occasion offence.”).
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individual members with the interests of Congress as a whole and 
protects their deliberation for the common good. 
This principle provides grounds for resolving a circuit split as to 
whether the Speech and Debate Clause provides an individual privilege 
from nondisclosure.260 While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article, an understanding of the collective Congress seems to support a 
view that the privilege must be closely connected to the official duties of 
representatives and senators. “[The privilege] is restrained to things done 
in the House in a Parliamentary course . . . . For [the member] is not to 
have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to exceed the bounds and 
limits of his place and duty.”261
Within the collective Congress, members have no individual power, 
only the power of an office that exercises part of the collective legislative 
power. The Supreme Court explained, “The immunities of the Speech or 
Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the 
personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the 
integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of 
individual legislators.”262 The privilege should follow the power—the 
power is only a partial one within the collective, and accordingly the 
privilege perhaps should relate only to the exercise of their partial 
legislative power. By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the 
President’s executive privilege extends to the “outer perimeter” of his 
duties, in part because of the nature of executive power.263
The Constitution carefully circumscribes the boundaries of legislative 
power and the individual power of each member. The text and structure
support a narrow reading of the Speech and Debate Clause, limiting it to 
a member’s official duties as part of the collective. The values cited to 
support a more expansive reading, including that the disclosure of 
legislative material would intrude into the legislative process,264 do not 
fit with the role of members as simply one part of the collective Congress.
                                                                                                                     
260. Compare United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2112, 497 F.3d 654, 656
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Speech and Debate Clause contains a privilege of 
nondisclosure), with United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to 
adopt the rationale of the D.C. Circuit). “[The Speech and Debate Clause] does not incorporate a 
non-disclosure privilege as to any branch.” Id.
261. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 20 (1854),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 704 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943)).
262. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
263. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (“In view of the special nature of the 
President’s constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute 
Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official 
responsibility.”).
264. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 660.
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3.  Prohibition on Execution and Self-Dealing in Office
As discussed above, Congress as an institution has no power to 
execute the laws or to exercise the judicial power. The individual 
members of Congress similarly lack these powers. The Constitution 
carefully excludes members from the execution of the laws and from 
realizing certain types of benefits from their legislative service.265 These 
restrictions on senators and representatives serve a number of purposes, 
such as reinforcing their circumscribed role as parts of the collective 
Congress, securing their independence of the other departments of 
government, and maintaining the integrity of the legislative power 
exercised on behalf of the people.
Perhaps the most significant restriction, the Incompatibility Clause,
prohibits members of Congress from simultaneously serving as an 
Officer of the United States: “no Person holding any Office under the 
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance 
in Office.”266 Professor Steven Calabresi and now-Judge Joan Larsen 
have provided a comprehensive originalist examination of the Clause and 
explained how it serves a number of fundamental separation of powers 
principles.267 Foremost, it prevents members from participating in the 
execution of the laws. It also prohibits the type of parliamentary 
government found in England where members of Parliament 
simultaneously serve as executive ministers.268
The Incompatibility Clause also reinforces the exclusivity of the 
legislative power. Senators and representatives cannot simultaneously 
enact legislation and serve as executive officers who administer and 
execute legislation. The Constitution creates a Congress with members 
who exercise part of a collective legislative role, a role incompatible with 
execution.269 It addresses the concern expressed by Locke and Rousseau 
that lawmakers must be restricted to making laws, because laws concern 
the general good, not the particular application.270 Once the lawmaker 
partakes of execution, it perverts and corrupts the lawmaking power. 
Both Congress as an institution and the members as individuals have only 
                                                                                                                     
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
266. Id.
267. Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1094 (1994).
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“Legislative power, 
as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or 
appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive 
functions.”). 
270. See supra Section I.A.
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legislative powers. This parallel structure bolsters the collective 
Congress and the exclusivity of legislative power.
Similarly, the Constitution prohibits members from legislating offices 
for their own benefit. The Ineligibility Clause provides: “No Senator or 
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have 
been encreased during such time.”271 Members cannot create offices or 
increase the salary of offices in anticipation of being appointed to those 
offices.272
The Ineligibility Clause recognizes that collective action might not
prevent laws that would benefit individual members of Congress. 
Collective lawmaking aims at the general good and frustrates the 
satisfaction of particular interests, but the Constitution specifically 
prohibits members from being appointed to new or enhanced offices. 
This provides an additional check against members’ self-dealing, even if 
this check has largely been evaded by appointment of members to 
existing offices.273 The Ineligibility Clause is an explicit limitation on 
using legislative power for individual benefit, and further promotes the 
fiduciary obligations of members to their constituents and to the general, 
not personal, good.274
These limitations on the powers of individual members serve 
important separation of powers principles, creating a barrier between the 
lawmaker and the law interpreter. During the Convention, the Framers 
quickly agreed on a principle of incompatibility of offices, but debated 
at some length the issue of ineligibility. In particular, there was concern 
that Congress not be the lackey of the President, with members 
ingratiating for favors and offices.275 On the flip side, the Incompatibility 
                                                                                                                     
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen 
Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1994).
272. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
273. See Note, The Ineligibility Clauses’ Lost History: Presidential Patronage and 
Congress, 1787-1850, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (2010).
274. This also relates to Madison’s concern that in the legislative process representatives 
serve as both parties and judges, which is why they can act only collectively, and not as 
individuals. By restricting mechanisms for individual benefit, the Constitution encourages 
members to work together to exercise the legislative power. See supra notes 92–95 and 
accompanying text.
275. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 11, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the 
Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses are “important guards against the danger of executive 
influence upon the legislative body”).
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Clause reinforces the independence of the executive branch, ensuring 
that executive officers answer only to the President, not to Congress.276
Other provisions similarly ensure the separation between individual 
members of Congress and the executive power. The Vice President is 
designated as the President of the Senate, yet when the Vice President 
exercises the Office of the President, the Constitution specifies that the 
President pro tempore of the Senate will serve.277 The Constitution 
provides for this eventuality, carefully specifying that the same person 
cannot exercise both executive and legislative power.
Members of Congress possess exclusively legislative powers, and are 
prohibited from serving in the executive branch. Moreover, they cannot 
appoint or remove executive officers (except through impeachment).278
This confirms members’ partial role within the collective Congress and 
denies them any individual power.
4. Quorums, Supermajorities, and Other Numbers
The relationship between individual senators and representatives and 
their respective chambers is further developed in the numbers needed for 
particular legislative actions. The Constitution tailors the required level 
of legislative support to the nature and importance of the legislative 
action. The number of lawmakers reinforces just how collective an action 
must be.
For instance, the Constitution provides for several different quorum 
rules. The Framers debated whether to specify the requirements for a 
quorum and ultimately agreed that “a Majority of each shall constitute a 
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to 
day.”279 This explicit requirement within the Constitution placed a floor 
on the number of representatives for the passage of law. It ensured a 
certain degree of representation and avoided the passage of laws by too 
small a minority of members. Yet the ordinary quorum requirement 
allows laws to be enacted by a minority of lawmakers—a majority of a 
bare majority would allow enactment with just over one-quarter of 
representatives and senators. 
Importantly, the Constitution does not leave the size of the quorum to 
be determined by Congress. It is not part of the internal matters left for 
                                                                                                                     
276. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 267, at 1088–89 (explaining why the 
Incompatibility Clause “has almost certainly increased presidential power by securing 
presidential independence from Congress” because without the Clause, members of Congress 
would demand appointment to prestigious offices in order to pass the President’s legislative 
agenda). 
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
278. See infra notes 318–20 and accompanying text.
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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each house to determine, such as the rules of proceedings and 
punishments for members. The size of the quorum relates to the nature 
and breadth of representation and therefore is fixed in the Constitution. 
The quorum reflects a judgment about the minimum collective for 
representative government. The Supreme Court has reserved the 
authority to review whether a quorum existed for the passage of a bill, 
but only by applying the standards for certifying a quorum under the rules 
of the chamber of Congress.280
Both Madison and Hamilton defended the majority-quorum rule as 
well as the majority-voting rule for ordinary legislation in order to 
prevent a minority from blocking legislation for the public good.281 A
majority of the people’s representatives must make the laws that bind 
society. This relates to the importance of having a large enough group of 
representatives, so that the government is a truly republican one and not 
a “junto” or “cabal.”282 This promotes lawmaking for the general good 
rather than allowing the pursuit of narrow interests.
The Constitution also contains several supermajority requirements,
including two-thirds of the Senate for removal after impeachment,283
two-thirds to expel a member from the House or Senate,284 two-thirds in 
each house to override the President’s veto,285 two-thirds of the Senate 
                                                                                                                     
280. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892); see also supra note 254 and accompanying 
text (discussing the enrolled bill doctrine).
281. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 11, at 305 (James Madison) (“It has been said that 
more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in 
all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted 
from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some 
particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these 
considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where 
justice, or the general good, might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, 
the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the 
majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
22, supra note 11, at 140–41 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To give a minority a negative upon the 
majority, which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision, is, in its 
tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. . . . But its real operation 
is, to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of government, and to substitute the 
pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular 
deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. . . . If a pertinacious minority can controul
the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that 
something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the 
smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. 
Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the 
public good.”).
282. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
284. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
285. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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to ratify a treaty,286 and two-thirds of both the House and Senate to amend 
the Constitution along with ratification by three-fourths of the States.287
The actions that require a supermajority, however, are not exercises of 
the “legislative power.”288
One feature the supermajority requirements share is they pertain to 
discrete issues requiring a high level of consensus. For example, the 
supermajority required for overriding the President’s veto gives the 
House and Senate a binary choice—they are no longer formulating or 
amending the law, but deciding whether a law that already passed both 
houses has the support for being enacted without the President’s support. 
Similarly, constitutional amendments usually address important, but 
discrete, subjects. The impeachment and removal of a high-ranking 
official requires judgment rendered about an individual’s actions. 
Expulsion of a member of a Congress by two-thirds vote similarly 
focuses on the misconduct of a particular person. This is not to suggest 
that such choices are easy or cannot raise difficult considerations, but 
they are limited in their scope, unlike most legislation. Moreover, 
decisions that require a supermajority arguably pose a more pressing 
need for consensus because of their gravity.289
The Framers debated the merits of majority and supermajority rules—
aware of the trade-offs between allowing the majority to prevail in their 
judgment or providing a minority group the ability to block or frustrate 
the majority.290 A modern debate continues about the desirability and 
lawfulness of additional supermajoritarian requirements, such as the 
filibuster, or supermajority requirements for the enactment of certain 
types of legislation.291 For example, Professors John O. McGinnis and 
                                                                                                                     
286. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
287. Id. art. V.
288. See, e.g., Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The 
Framers, The Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON 
HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 406 (1998) (arguing that the supermajority requirements all “either relate 
to important actions taken unicamerally by state representation or provide for the Congressional 
reversal of a decision previously taken by another ‘majority rule’ entity. Given the unique 
architecture of the Constitution, I would argue that both of these principles serve to reinforce 
notions of popular sovereignty”).
289. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 805 (2002) (explaining that supermajoritarianism is a process of “establishing 
social consensus through eliciting broad social support for legal innovations”).
290. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 11, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To give a 
minority a negative upon the majority, which is always the case where more than a majority is 
requisite to a decision, is, in its tendency to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the 
lesser.”).
291. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 289, at 805 (“The United States Constitution is 
pervasively and enduringly supermajoritarian.”); King, supra note 288, at 406. King argues that 
the supermajority requirements all “either relate to important actions taken unicamerally by state 
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Michael B. Rappaport have argued that supermajority requirements for 
ordinary legislation would be constitutional.292 Others have argued such 
rules would be unconstitutional and that the Senate’s filibuster is 
similarly unconstitutional.293 Both sides have raised a number of 
important textual, structural, and historical arguments supporting their 
views. The principles underlying the collective Congress could provide 
further grounds for evaluating the constitutionality of supermajority 
requirements and how they might be structured.
In addition to these often debated supermajoritarian requirements, the 
Constitution also includes provisions that confer power on minority 
groups of lawmakers. Used to check other lawmakers, these provisions 
create a supervisory relationship between members who serve together 
in the House or Senate. For example, only one-fifth of members present 
can require the yeas and nays be entered on any question.294 By 
compelling the lawmaking majority to reveal their preferences on a 
particular vote, this mechanism empowers the minority to ensure 
accountability (or at least transparency) for legislation that has majority 
support.
Another mechanism for minority groups of lawmakers allows them 
“to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and 
under such Penalties as each House may provide.”295 The Constitution 
                                                                                                                     
representation or provide for the Congressional reversal of a decision previously taken by another 
‘majority rule’ entity. Given the unique architecture of the Constitution, [King] would argue that 
both of these principles serve to reinforce notions of popular sovereignty.” Id.; see also Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority 
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 761 (1994). Amar suggests that 
constitutional discourse focuses too much on the Bill of Rights “and so we have missed the many 
ways in which [the Constitution] was also structured to enhance majority rule and promote 
popular sovereignty.” Id.
292. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative 
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 485 (“[J]ust as the text of the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause authorizes the House to issue a rule providing that bills pass by majority 
vote, it also authorizes the issuance of a rule providing for a supermajority. A supermajority rule 
would be illegal only if it conflicted with some other clause of the Constitution or some implicit 
constitutional principle.”).
293. See Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 
1015 (2011) (providing a structural argument against the filibuster); see also Jed Rubenfeld, 
Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 90 (1996) (“Article I, Section 7, 
grants the Congress power to make law for the nation by majority vote, with only the President 
standing in the way. The three-fifths rule is in reality the assertion of a power to contract this core 
power: it is an attempt by majority vote of the House to take away the power of Congress to make 
law by majority vote. As a result, the three-fifths rule facilitates the accumulation of excessive 
authority by other players in the constitutional system.”). 
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“[T]he Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on 
any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”).
295. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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empowers a small number of members to force other members to 
participate in the lawmaking process at least by attending a session of 
Congress. This provides a kind of accountability and security against the 
withholding of the legislative power by members who would deny the 
necessary quorum.296
Requiring a record of votes or compelling the attendance of members
provides an internal checking mechanism between members and for 
minority groups of lawmakers. These powers promote the accountability 
and integrity of the collective legislative process and can be used as 
mechanisms for aligning the interests of individual members with the 
successful operation of their house of Congress.297 Even in this context 
where individual members have some additional power, it serves 
primarily to bolster the collective legislative power. 
***
The Constitution carefully creates a collective Congress at the center 
of the republican form of government. The components of Congress—
the two chambers and the individual senators and representatives—
reinforce the structure of collective lawmaking for the general good.
Acting alone, each chamber can exercise only non-legislative powers. 
Members of Congress have no individual lawmaking power, nor can they 
exercise the executive or judicial powers. The insulation of members 
from particular matters, execution, and implementation of the law, 
prevents the fragmentation of the collective and reinforces the 
independence of Congress and the integrity and exclusivity of the 
lawmaking power. 
IV. THE COLLECTIVE CONGRESS IN THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION
Using structural interpretation, this Part analyzes the implications of 
vesting the legislative power in a collective Congress. Primarily it 
explains why the legislative power must be exercised only by Congress 
and not the executive. These structural arguments consider the 
relationship between the departments of the federal government and how 
their powers interact.298 This approach focuses on the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                     
296. Unlike the provision for allowing one-fifth of members present to require the recording 
of the yeas and nays, the Constitution does not provide the number of members necessary to 
compel attendance, stating only that a “smaller Number” than a quorum “may be authorized” to 
compel attendance. Id. Moreover, the power to compel other members is not given directly in the 
Constitution, but requires each house to authorize the action “in such Manner, and under such 
Penalties as each House may provide.” Id.
297. See infra Section IV.B.
298. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 
(1969). Black explains the method of drawing inferences from the structure of the Constitution 
63
Rao: Why Congress Matters: The Collective Congress in the Structural C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
64 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
vesting of specific powers in institutions with carefully delineated 
structures and looks holistically at how power operates across the three 
coordinate departments of the federal government.299
This analysis further elucidates the values and purposes of collective 
lawmaking. First, the collective Congress serves values of deliberation, 
compromise, generality, and promotion of the general good. Second, the 
collective Congress fits into the separation of powers by aligning the 
ambitions of members of Congress with Congress as an institution.
Collective decisionmaking reinforces the exclusivity of the lawmaking 
power and imposes a practical barrier to exercising executive or judicial 
powers. Third, the Supreme Court has recognized in a variety of contexts 
that Congress cannot circumvent the collectivity requirement; that is, the 
collective Congress provides an underlying rationale for some of the 
judicial limits on congressional action.
A. Collectivity Values: Deliberation, Compromise, and Generality
Just as the unitary structure of the executive branch promotes energy, 
dispatch, and responsibility, similarly the collective Congress promotes 
deliberation, compromise, generality, and the common good. Congress 
is the institution for protecting these civic republican values.300 As 
explained above, the collective Congress relates to the creation of a 
republican form of government. It allows the people to choose 
representatives to exercise the legislative power, mediating the different 
interests of society for the general good. Although the Constitution does 
not specify the particular content of laws, Congress is structured to 
promote legislation that serves the good of the people, not narrow 
interests.
To be clear, the collective legislative power is no guarantee that laws 
will promote the general good. Rather collective legislative power is our 
Constitution’s mechanism for identifying and pursuing the general good. 
                                                                                                                     
and notes “[t]here is . . . a close and perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational 
and structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are themselves created 
by the text, and the inference drawn from the must surely be controlled by the text.” Id.; cf. M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 624–25 (2001) (expressing skepticism about structural and formal methods that try “to assign 
specific exercises of government authority based on the general normative reason for the power 
allocation”).
299. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1216 (1992) (explaining why “only a 
holistic approach to constitutional analysis gives coherent meaning to all the provisions of Article 
III”).
300. A significant literature exists on “civic republicanism” and its scope and applications. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540–41 (1988)
(gathering sources and describing key principles of republican theory).
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Representatives working together must first identify the public good and 
then must compromise on how to achieve those goals. Invariably in a 
large and diverse nation, ongoing disputes will occur both about the 
public good and the means for achieving it. The collective Congress and 
democratic representation serve these values of working for the general 
good, even if they do not always achieve them. As economist and 
philosopher Friedrich Hayek explained:
Liberalism is a doctrine about what the law ought to be, 
democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what 
will be the law. Liberalism regards it as desirable that only 
what the majority accepts should in fact be law, but it does 
not believe that this is therefore necessarily good law.301
In a similar manner, the unitary executive is designed to promote 
energetic execution—unitariness is the Constitution’s mechanism for 
good administration of the laws. The fact that a unitary executive cannot 
always achieve this ideal does not undermine the importance of a unitary 
executive.
Collective decisionmaking helps to identify and promote the general 
good in several ways. A multimember lawmaking body requires
cooperation, negotiation, and deliberation. As James Madison stated, the 
effect of lawmaking by representatives should be “to refine and enlarge 
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body 
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to 
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”302 The legislative 
process refines and enlarges disparate public views. Through the exercise 
of reasoned debate, different interests may be brought together and 
negotiated in order to yield an enlarged view of the public good. “[I]t is 
the reason of the public alone, that ought to control and regulate the 
government. The passions ought to be controled and regulated by the 
government.”303 Alexis de Tocqueville similarly argued that only in a 
democratic form of government would the public have a reason to 
educate themselves and to form the proper opinions for their 
governance.304
As discussed above, the Framers frequently referred to regulating, 
umpiring, and aggregating interests—all suggesting that the legislative 
                                                                                                                     
301. HAYEK, supra note 40, at 103; see also id. at 108 (“But if the prospects of individual 
liberty are better in a democracy than under other forms of government, this does not mean that 
they are certain.”).
302. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 46 (James Madison). 
303. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 11, at 264 (James Madison).
304. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55–56 (1835).
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process would require deliberation to achieve some collective benefit. 
Importantly, neither the executive nor the courts could properly achieve 
these ends. As Hamilton noted, “The differences of opinion, and the 
jarring of parties in [the legislature], though they may sometimes obstruct 
salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection; and 
serve to check excesses in the majority.”305 Collective representation in 
the legislature serves the beneficial purpose of providing a 
“constitutional averaging process” that weighs and balances various 
interests in order to produce legislation.306 This process was designed to
legislate for the general good by mediating the interests of factions, 
thwarting oppressive majorities, and controlling powerful minorities. 
B. Collective Ambition and Separation of Powers
In a system of separated powers, the structure of collective 
lawmaking aligns the incentives of members with the institution of 
Congress. Members’ interests are aligned because they can exercise only 
a part of the collective legislative power and therefore must work 
together for the successful operation of Congress. Moreover, the 
Constitution carefully excludes members from non-legislative powers, 
particularly preventing them from execution, or otherwise controlling the 
executive power through appointment and removal. The nondelegation 
principle similarly maintains this alignment of interests by preventing 
members from relocating the legislative power to executive agencies. 
Finally, the requirements of bicameralism and presentment place a 
practical barrier to Congress exercising or controlling the executive and 
judicial powers through legislation. Thus carefully circumscribed to the 
legislative power, members have every incentive to support Congress 
because they can exercise public power only through Congress as an 
institution.
As Madison wrote in Federalist 51, the Constitution arranged the 
three departments to serve as a check on each other, “giving to those who 
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and 
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . The interest 
of the man, must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place.”307 Madison recognized, however, that “it is not possible to give 
                                                                                                                     
305. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 11, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton).
306. H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1036 (1975) (“The structure in which . . . local representatives meet, 
however, provides a corrective for their parochial biases. Because each piece of legislation needs 
at least the majority support of each legislating body, local interests tend to cancel each other out. 
Thus, legislation passes through what is effectively a constitutional averaging process based on a 
specific, preestablished weighting system, designed to cut across potential factional interests.”).
307. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 268–69 (James Madison).
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to each department an equal power of self-defence,”308 and that in 
republican government “the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates.”309
Yet in the Madisonian government of ambition counteracting 
ambition, what is the incentive for members of Congress to defend the 
institution of Congress? The question of incentives is more readily 
answered for the single President who unites personal ambition with the 
strength and success of the executive branch.310 The difficulty of 
congressional incentives has come into focus in the modern era. As a 
descriptive matter, there is widespread agreement that Congress fails to 
defend its prerogatives and that a number of structural realities hamper 
Congress’s ability to function effectively.311 As a consequence, some 
political scientists, such as William Howell and Terry Moe, have argued 
that Congress and its constitutional form of lawmaking are a “relic” that 
fails to function properly and thus more power should vest in the 
executive.312 Legal professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have 
also argued about the necessity and desirability of more executive 
lawmaking.313
Implicit in these critiques is an assumption about the availability of 
executive lawmaking—that law may be formulated either by Congress 
or by expert agencies and that the choice should turn on which institution 
provides functional benefits of efficiency, expertise, and flexibility. It 
should be obvious that such arguments are possible only after the 
complete demise of the nondelegation principle, because the Constitution
does not pose a binary choice between lawmaking in Congress or the 
executive; instead it vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in 
                                                                                                                     
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Rao, supra note 9, at 1487.
311. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006); see generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1995) (explaining 
how Congress uses delegation to make laws through federal agencies); PETER M. SHANE,
MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009)
(explaining how a partisan and complaisant Congress has contributed to an abuse of executive 
power).
312. HOWELL & MOE, supra note 3, at 88 (“Under the Constitution, Congress is granted the 
authority to make the laws, and the fact that it makes them badly—and indeed, is wired to make 
them badly—fatally undermines the ability of American government to meet the challenges of 
modern society.”).
313. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 31 (2010); VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 209 (“Judges and lawyers have 
collectively realized that the very principles and doctrines that law created to check the 
administrative state, rightly understood and with their logic worked all the way through, 
themselves indicate that administrative discretion should be extremely broad.”).
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Congress.314 Our Constitution requires an effective Congress to bring 
together the interests of the people, to identify the common good, and to 
use the power of government when necessary to solve common 
problems. Allowing for a parallel lawmaking track in the executive 
unravels these important protections.
Rather than simply accept more expedient administrative lawmaking, 
the values of a collective and representative legislature make it 
imperative to reinvigorate constitutional safeguards for the effectiveness 
of Congress. Although the Constitution vests Congress with enough 
powers to be the most dangerous branch,315 the institutional strength and 
defense of Congress are rooted in the mechanisms identified in this 
Article: collective decisionmaking and the exclusivity and insulation of 
the legislative power within Congress. These structural features align the 
incentives of the members with the institution; they provide a solution, 
perhaps the only solution, for ensuring the institutional strength and 
integrity of Congress in the system of separation of powers. 
First, collectivity requires that members work toward the success of 
Congress. Individual members can implement their interests and 
ambitions only through enacting legislation. Given but one vote in the 
collective lawmaking power, the individual lawmaker must work for the 
effective operation of Congress. Even the most senior and powerful 
senator or representative must convince a majority to agree to his 
legislative proposals. In order to serve even a part of his interests, a 
member must negotiate, compromise, and deliberate with others to
produce legislation. Thus, the requirement for collective lawmaking 
aligns the ambitions of members with successful lawmaking in Congress. 
As Rousseau noted, the private good almost always has a stronger 
pull than the public good.316 The collective Congress requires legislative 
power to be exercised by a majority of both houses, and to receive the 
requisite number of votes, legislation must serve some collective good. 
This frustrates lawmakers from implementing laws that service their
individual and private good. In the legislature, the part has no power to 
control the whole—a single member cannot independently exercise the 
legislative power. Since the legislative power can be exercised only 
together, the interests of members should align with protecting the 
prerogatives of Congress. 
Second, the exclusivity of the legislative power reinforces this 
mechanism by explicitly prohibiting members from exercising the 
executive and judicial powers. Members cannot avoid the difficulties
inherent in the collective legislative power by instead exercising one of 
the other powers of government. The Constitution, through specific 
                                                                                                                     
314. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
315. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 11 (James Madison).
316. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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textual limits, as well as through its structure, separates the legislative 
power from the implementation and application of the laws. As discussed 
above, members have no independent legislative power and they are 
barred from exercising executive or judicial power. The Incompatibility 
Clause prevents members from serving as executive officers317 and the 
Constitution carefully keeps Congress from the appointment and 
removal of executive officers. The Appointments Clause gives the 
President the power of appointment over principal officers, subject to the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Congress “may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”318
The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated the attempts of Congress 
to control the appointment or removal of executive officers.319 Thus, 
members have no power to execute the law directly and they are 
prohibited from controlling the execution of the laws through other 
means.
In addition, the Senate’s power to provide advice and consent to 
appointments of executive officers does not give the Senate control over 
execution; rather, this power serves as an important check in the 
appointment process.320 Officers remain in the chain of command to the 
President. The collective Congress can hold executive branch officers 
accountable through ordinary legislative processes, oversight hearings, 
and in extremis, impeachment and removal. Congress, however, holds no
other powers for controlling administration. Members of Congress also 
cannot serve as electors and thereby cannot partake in the selection of the 
President.321
Thus, while the pull of private and individual interests may drive 
representatives and senators, they have no opportunity to run the 
bureaucracy or otherwise exercise executive powers. These limitations 
should encourage members to focus their attention on the difficult 
business of enacting laws.
                                                                                                                     
317. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
318. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
319. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1986) (“[B]ecause Congress has 
retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive 
powers.”); see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (holding commissioners appointed 
by Congress cannot exercise executive powers, which can only be exercised by “Officers of the 
United States” appointed in accordance with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2); see also Neomi Rao, 
Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014)
(explaining that Congress’s powers are limited to prevent encroachment on the executive power).
320. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
321. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of 
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
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The nondelegation principle also reinforces the collective Congress 
and exclusivity of the legislative power. Article I, Section 1, vests all 
legislative power in Congress. This includes a principle of 
nondelegation.322 Maintaining legislative power within the elected and 
collective legislature serves a number important values of democratic 
accountability, requiring that binding laws be made by the people’s 
representatives. In addition, if Congress can delegate lawmaking power 
to executive agencies, this fractures the interests of Congress, as I have 
explained elsewhere.323 Delegation creates regulatory discretion for 
executive officials, which members of Congress can then work to 
influence and control. Delegation unravels the collective Congress by 
allowing members to meddle in administration and by creating a strong 
incentive for members to influence the regulatory process, rather than 
make laws. Thus, it destroys the primary mechanism for bolstering the 
independence and integrity of Congress as an institution.
Collectivity also serves as a practical restraint on Congress, enforcing 
the separation of powers by making it difficult for members of Congress 
to use the legislative power for exercising the executive or judicial 
powers. The Framers feared the combination of power, and in particular 
combinations with the legislative power, which could draw everything 
into its vortex. Creating a requirement for large numbers of members to 
act in concert practically and functionally prevents Congress from 
executing or adjudicating the law. Just as the unitary executive is 
designed for energetic execution, the collective Congress is disabled 
structurally from execution.
Similarly, the checks Congress has over the other branches must all 
be exercised collectively. Congress’s tools of impeachment and removal, 
which exert control over the Judiciary and President, are extremely blunt 
and must be exercised collectively. Impeachment by the House requires
a majority, and removal requires two-thirds of the Senate. Congress 
cannot reduce the salary of a sitting judge324 and cannot increase or 
diminish the salary of the President during his term.325 So Congress 
cannot use the power of the purse to target judges or the President as 
individual officeholders.
                                                                                                                     
322. See Lawson, supra note 126, at 328.
323. See generally Rao, supra note 9.
324. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, 
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their continuance in Office.”).
325. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a 
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he 
shall have been elected.”).
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While this Section has focused on how the collective Congress limits 
legislative control over the other departments, members and 
congressional committees undoubtedly have a variety of legislative 
tools—oversight, appropriations, investigations, informal contacts—to 
cajole, pressure, and control the executive branch. Indeed, such control 
may at times be quite effective.326 Such influence, however, depends on 
the political balance of power between the President and the Congress. 
Congress can take no binding action against the other branches except 
through legislation or through impeachment and removal. By contrast, 
the President can frustrate or decline enforcement of the laws on 
constitutional grounds,327 and a single district court judge can declare a 
law unconstitutional.
Collective decisionmaking is thus a deep feature of congressional 
power, bolstered by the text and structure of the Constitution. Delegation 
that places lawmaking outside of Congress allows members to exercise 
independent power threaten Congress as an institution by undermining 
collective lawmaking and circumventing the exclusivity of the legislative 
power. The limits on Congress work together to preserve the 
independence and integrity of lawmaking—they separate lawmaking 
from the other powers of the government in order to promote lawmaking 
most conductive to promoting the general good. 
C. Collectivity as Restraint on Legislative Power
Collectivity serves as a restraint on legislative power and on the 
power of individual lawmakers. Yet Congress and its individual 
members have tried a variety of mechanisms to alter the requirements of 
collectivity or exclusivity. The Supreme Court has consistently
invalidated congressional efforts to circumvent the collectivity or the 
exclusivity of the legislative power (with the notable exception of cases 
raising nondelegation challenges, discussed below). These decisions 
demonstrate how principles of the collective Congress connect a range 
of separation of powers cases.
The Constitution vests Congress and the President with specific 
characteristics that provide both power and restraint. The President has 
the strength and energy of being a unitary actor, which includes authority 
to act independently and to direct and to control the execution of the laws. 
His singular position at the head of the executive department, however, 
also imposes responsibility and accountability. Congress is vested with 
the awesome collective legislative power to determine how the 
government will exercise its authority over the life, liberty, and property 
                                                                                                                     
326. See Jack Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 144
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327. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional 
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of the people. Yet collectivity also imposes Congress’s primary restraint. 
Representatives and senators must reach majority agreement, and receive 
the President’s approval, to enact legislation. 
Although collectivity remains the hallmark of the exercise of 
legislative power, Congress has frequently sought to disaggregate 
legislative power through mechanisms that empower one branch of 
Congress, bolster power for individual members, or otherwise work to 
change the careful process of Article I, Section 7. The Supreme Court 
has consistently resisted attempts to modify the collective legislative 
process. Most notably, in INS v. Chadha,328 the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional the one-house legislative veto, explaining that it violated 
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment for legislative actions. 
Thus, when the “House took action that had the purpose and effect of 
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the 
Attorney General, executive branch officials and Chadha, all outside the 
legislative branch,” such action was deemed a legislative action for 
which the Constitution requires bicameralism and presentment.329 The 
Court prevented one house of Congress from taking legislative action.330
The one-house veto violated the fundamental principle that only 
Congress as a whole can exercise legislative power.
Similarly, in Clinton v. City of New York,331 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act (LIVA), drawing on the reasoning 
from Chadha that Congress cannot modify the collective legislative 
process that requires bicameralism and presentment.332 The LIVA 
allowed the President to cancel certain types of spending.333 The Court 
explained that such action allowed the President to repeal or amend the 
statute, and the President had no such authority under the Constitution.334
“If the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the President 
to create a different law—one whose text was not voted on by either 
House of Congress or presented to the President for signature.”335 This 
reaffirms the importance of exclusivity of the legislative power and the 
                                                                                                                     
328. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
329. Id. at 952.
330. Id. at 958–59.
331. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
332. Id. at 438.
333. Id. at 421.
334. Id. (“In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress 
by repealing a portion of each. ‘[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with 
Art. I.’ There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, 
or to repeal statutes.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954)).
335. Id. at 448.
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problem of delegating legislative authority to the President.336 The 
President cannot unilaterally modify, amend, or repeal a statute—those 
actions must all be taken according to the process of Article I, Section 7, 
calling for collective action by Congress. 
The Supreme Court has also restricted the ability of members of 
Congress to use the judicial process to achieve their political goals. 
Members generally lack standing to challenge executive branch actions, 
except in some very limited contexts. These cases reinforce the partial 
power of members within Congress and confirm the importance of the 
collective Congress as an institution in disputes against the executive. 
The D.C. Circuit for a number of years allowed quite lax congressional 
standing.337 In Raines v. Byrd,338 however, the Supreme Court disallowed 
standing for a member of Congress to challenge the LIVA.339
The reasoning in Raines strongly reinforced Congress’s institutional 
power and held that individual members have no personal right to 
exercise political power, because that power runs with their particular 
seats. In Raines, Senator Byrd claimed that the LIVA causes an 
institutional injury by diminishing the legislative power, which injures 
all members of Congress equally.  In response, the Court explained that 
members had no personal right to the political power of their seats.340 As 
the Court explained:
If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no 
longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his 
successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) 
with the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member holds (it 
may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, 
not as a prerogative of personal power.341
This case goes to the relationship between the individual members 
and Congress as an institution. The Court makes clear that the individual 
member occupies an office that exercises a portion of legislative 
power.342 The member, however, has no personal right to exercise that 
                                                                                                                     
336. Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (framing the problem of 
the Line Item Veto Act in terms of delegation).
337. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (holding 
that senators had standing to challenge President Carter’s unilateral termination of a mutual 
defense treaty with the Republic of China); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (holding that Senator Kennedy had standing to challenge whether a bill had become a law 
through the “pocket veto” when the President failed to sign or to veto it).
338. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
339. Id. at 813.
340. Id. at 829.
341. Id. at 821.
342. Id.
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power and therefore no personal injury from the operation of the 
statute.343 The Court also “attach[es] some importance to the fact that 
appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses 
of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their 
suit.”344 If a collective “collegial body” declines to litigate an issue, its 
members generally will lack standing.345
Congress has increasingly sought to vindicate its constitutional and 
political interests as an institution in the courts. Most recently, the House 
of Representatives brought suit against the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services for using unappropriated funds to implement the 
Affordable Care Act.346 The district court allowed standing for the 
House.347 The court reasoned, “Where the dispute is over true 
implementation, Congress retains its traditional checks and balances—
most prominently its purse strings. But when the appropriations process 
is itself circumvented, Congress finds itself deprived of its constitutional 
role and injured in a more particular and concrete way.”348 The House 
was an injured party because of its institutional interest in the 
appropriations process.349 The case is pending on appeal and scholars 
have continued to debate the appropriateness of standing in this 
context.350
Recognition of the importance of the collective Congress could help 
elucidate whether a single house of Congress has standing or if Congress 
as a whole is necessary to maintain suit.  One question is whether a single 
house can be an “institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional 
                                                                                                                     
343. Id.
344. Id. at 829.
345. Id.
346. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016); U.S. 
House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015).  
347. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 81; see also Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (enjoining the 
use of unappropriated monies to fund reimbursements under Section 1402 of the Affordable Care 
Act).
348. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 75.
349. Id. at 71.
350. See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 339, 373 (2015) (taking an expansive view of congressional functions and defining 
standing to include situations in which the bargaining power of Congress is diluted); Bethany R. 
Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of 
Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2016) (arguing in favor of 
congressional institutional standing particularly when the executive declines to enforce a law); 
Nicholas Bagley, Oh Boy. Here We Go Again, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/oh-boy-here-we-go-again/ (arguing against 
standing).
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injury.”351 Although the House controls appropriations, the enactment of 
appropriations still must satisfy the requirements of collective 
decisionmaking in Article I, Section 7. Does the House count separately 
as an institutional plaintiff because of its role in originating 
appropriations? Would it make a difference if Congress as a whole, both 
the House and Senate, had authorized the lawsuit? The Constitution 
carefully structures Congress so that it can overrule the action of one of 
the coordinate branches only when acting collectively.352 A successful 
lawsuit by the House would allow a single chamber to change the 
President’s execution of the laws. This result may run afoul of the 
collective Congress, because it allows a part of Congress to use the 
judiciary against the executive. 
In a related series of cases, courts have held that members of Congress 
cannot sue the executive for enforcement of the laws because “[t]he 
failure or refusal of the executive branch to execute accomplished 
legislation does not affect the legal status of such legislation; nor does it 
invade, usurp, or infringe upon a Congressman’s power to make law.”353
Congress, and individual representatives and senators, have no power to 
execute the laws and cannot use the judicial process to force a certain 
type or degree of execution.354
The Supreme Court has also recently reaffirmed that a legislator’s 
vote belongs to the office, not to the legislator personally.355 The case 
involved a constitutional challenge to Nevada’s recusal law on the 
question of whether legislators have a “personal, First Amendment right 
to vote on any given matter.”356 The Supreme Court upheld the recusal 
law and explained that restrictions on voting are not restrictions upon a 
legislator’s protected speech because “a legislator’s vote is the 
commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the 
passage or defeat of a particular proposal. The legislative power thus 
committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people; the 
                                                                                                                     
351. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664
(2015).
352. One might suggest that the Senate’s advice and consent power for appointments and 
treaties allows for a one-house check on executive power. These powers of the Senate, however, 
are different from overruling an action of the President. When the Senate declines to approve a 
nomination or a treaty it does not overrule an action of the President; instead that appointment or 
treaty never takes effect. By contrast, to remove an officer requires both houses to impeach and 
remove, and to abrogate a treaty requires both houses to enact a new statute, which would control 
over the earlier treaty.
353. Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
354. Members may use other legislative tools to influence the execution of the laws,
sometimes quite effectively. See Beermann, supra note 326, at 144; Rao, supra note 9, at 1494.
355. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 126 (2011). 
356. Id. at 119.
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legislator has no personal right to it.”357 This echoes the rationale in 
Raines v. Byrd that members are agents of the people and have no 
individual right to the lawmaking power of their offices.358 Thus, the 
individual act of voting does not, at least for expressive purposes, belong 
to the legislator, but instead stems from the office that he holds.
The nondelegation cases stand as a notable departure from these 
decisions, because the Supreme Court regularly reaffirms even the most 
open-ended delegations of authority to agencies. In part, the Court does 
not recognize delegations as aggrandizing the power of individual 
members of Congress; but instead has maintained that Congress will 
police delegations because of its competition with the Executive 
Branch.359 Delegation, however, unravels the collective Congress and 
more likely leads to collusion between members of Congress and 
administrative agencies.360 Understanding delegation as a mechanism for 
undermining the collectivity and exclusivity of legislative power might 
provide for closer judicial scrutiny of delegated authority.361
***
The collective Congress within the constitutional structure reinforces 
important principles of separation of powers. The allocation of legislative 
power to a collective Congress provides the most legitimate mechanism 
for identifying and promoting the general good. Our Constitution 
fundamentally connects the collective and representative Congress with 
the lawmaking power. The structure of the collective Congress reinforces 
the integrity and strength of Congress because a stronger and more 
effective Congress will further its members’ interests. Mechanisms such 
as delegation that unravel the collective Congress undermine the 
legitimacy of lawmaking and upset the balance of powers, thereby 
threatening individual liberty.
                                                                                                                     
357. Id. at 125–26.
358. See also Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view no officers of the United States, of whatever Branch, exercise 
their governmental powers as personal prerogatives in which they have a judicially cognizable 
private interest. . . . They have a private right to the office itself, and to the emoluments of the 
office, but the powers of the office belong to the people and not to them.” (citations omitted)).
359. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Rao, supra note 9 at 1471–73.
360. See generally Rao, supra note 9.
361. Id. at 1409–12 (arguing for more robust judicial enforcement of the nondelegation 
principle because political safeguards and competition between Congress and the Executive fail 
to prevent delegations of lawmaking power).
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CONCLUSION: THE COLLECTIVE CONGRESS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
This Article forms part of a larger project to understand how the 
collective Congress relates to difficult separation of powers problems. A 
complete consideration of the implications goes beyond the scope of this 
Article, but most significantly, the collective Congress calls into question 
certain aspects of the administrative state. 
Underlying the growth of delegation to executive agencies and the 
expansion of administrative power rests a narrative about particular 
values, namely expertise, efficiency, and flexibility. These values can 
further good administration and execution of the laws, but they are not 
the values connected with lawmaking. The Constitution’s collective 
legislative power is designed to promote representation, deliberation, and 
the general good. Indeed, modern administrative law scholarship seeks 
to demonstrate how administration can promote some of the values 
traditionally associated with Congress, including deliberation and 
accountability to the public.362 Administrative agencies can try to pursue 
legislative values through internal checks and balances and public 
participation, yet these are second-best approximations when 
implemented within the executive branch through the bureaucracy. The 
existence and operation of the collective Congress forms the basic 
foundation of the nation and society; and executive branch lawmaking 
cannot provide a substitute for several reasons.
First, in a pluralistic society with many diverse interests, private 
interests conflict and disagreements will arise as to how best to identify 
and to pursue the general good. Given the conflicting nature of such 
interests, the Constitution establishes representative lawmaking as the 
mechanism for ascertaining and pursuing the general good. The Framers 
were hardly political naïfs and did not imagine that all acts of Congress 
would pursue the public good, or that legislation would never serve 
narrow factional interests. As Madison observed, the Constitution 
created a system representing many diverse interests.363 In a nation of 
                                                                                                                     
362. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992). Seidenfeld argues “civic republicanism provides a strong 
justification for the assignment of broad policymaking discretion to administrative agencies” 
because agencies provide “the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for 
deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity.” Id.; see also supra note 
6 and accompanying text (citing articles about the “administrative constitution”).
363. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 295–96 (James Madison) (“[B]y 
comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust 
combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable[,] . . . the society 
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of 
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sufficient size, the collective Congress would provide a forum for the
negotiation and deliberation of different interests and would protect
individual rights and liberty. 
The Constitution creates a Congress with the structure most 
conducive to and most legitimate for pursuing the general good when 
private rights are at stake. The exercise of the legislative power requires
a meeting of the minds between representatives. The administrative 
construction of regulation draws from public inputs and executive 
expertise, but ultimately expresses a bureaucratic decision about how to 
proceed. Regulation can never share the fundamental features of 
collective, representative lawmaking.364
Second, although nearly all discussions of the administrative state 
assume the inevitability of massive delegations to executive agencies, the 
collective Congress reinforces that nondelegation is a deep feature of the 
constitutional structure and republican government. In addition to other 
problems, delegation radically undermines the collective Congress. 
When Congress delegates in open-ended terms, it creates discretion 
within agencies. This expands the power of the executive branch, but it 
can also expand the power of individual members of Congress who can 
work with agencies to secure particular policies or waivers or exemptions 
for favored groups. As I have explained: 
Delegations can expand the influence and control of 
individual congressmen who will have persistent incentives 
to delegate. In such an environment, the competitive tension 
between the branches fails. This cross-branch collusion 
undermines individual liberty by allowing both branches to 
combine lawmaking and law interpretation and to exercise 
government functions without the requisite constitutional 
checks.365
Delegation allows for a dangerous combination of lawmaking with 
execution—both in the agencies and in Congress. As Locke, Rousseau, 
and Montesquieu all cautioned, the lawmaker cannot control particular 
applications, because this corrupts the process of making laws for the 
general good.366 Moreover, one of the greatest dangers to the legislative 
                                                                                                                     
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the 
majority.”).
364. HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 361. Hamburger notes that the President, the only elected 
member of the executive branch, “is not a representative body. A representative body must to 
some extent represent the nation’s diversity. It therefore cannot consist of a single person, and it 
must be elected in a way that to some extent reflects diversity, even if only because it is elected 
by the people in their different states and districts.” Id.
365. Rao, supra note 9, at 1506.
366. See supra Section I.A.
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power comes from representatives who usurp the power that should be 
exercised collectively.367
Delegation also fractures Congress and threatens the Constitution’s 
lawmaking structure. The Constitution’s primary, perhaps only, 
mechanism for ensuring Congress remains independent and effective is
the collective legislative power, which aligns the incentives and 
ambitions of members with Congress as an institution. As discussed 
above, the Constitution carefully insulates Congress and its members 
from exercising the executive or judicial powers—legislative power has 
double exclusivity. To realize their ambitions, members must work 
toward an effective Congress. If members can accomplish their policy 
goals outside of the legislative process, such as through regulatory 
policy, then Congress will be just a hollow shell.
Moreover, when delegated to agencies, legislative power is dispersed 
and isolated. Specialized agencies, often further subdivided by subject
and expertise, attend to narrow issues. Perhaps this is suited to the 
administration of laws, but not to the making of laws. The expertise of 
agencies is not designed to represent and reflect the broader interests of 
society or to promote the general good.
Delegation also eliminates the exclusivity of the lawmaking power, 
because once regulatory authority has been delegated, in effect, there 
exist two “lawmaking” entities. The agency has power to issue a 
regulation within its delegated authority and yet Congress always retains 
the power to enact legislation on those same issues. Under existing 
delegations, Congress and the agencies both have power over a very wide 
sweep of regulatory policy—which undermines both collectivity and 
exclusivity and unravels the separation of powers. 
Once open-ended authority is delegated to an agency, it is easy to lose 
sight of why Congress matters. Those seeking regulatory action can go 
either to Congress or an agency—and agencies generally move more 
quickly and are easier to control or to capture. Indeed, even members of 
Congress often look to agencies to accomplish their goals, rather than 
working to legislate.
Finally, the collective Congress provides another reason for trying to 
draw a substantive line between legislative and executive power. 
Commentators and the Supreme Court agree in theory that the 
“legislative power” cannot be delegated.368 Yet the cases and articles 
either have no particular conception of the substance of the legislative 
power, or a very thin view of legislative power as requiring only an 
                                                                                                                     
367. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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“intelligible principle.”369 The collective Congress gives substance to the 
legislative power as a representative meeting of the minds on difficult 
problems that might benefit from government action. It protects 
individual liberty by ensuring that all interests are represented in a
particular type of lawmaking process. 
The foregoing suggests how the collective Congress can serve as an 
interpretive guide to analyzing separation of powers questions, 
particularly in the context of the administrative state. The collective 
Congress also can provide a useful framework for understanding other 
separation of powers disputes regarding issues such as the Speech and 
Debate privilege for members of Congress,370 the legitimacy of 
supermajority rules for legislation,371 and standing in court for Congress 
to challenge executive branch action.372 These topics and others I hope 
will form the basis for future research and analysis. 
***
Congress still matters in our complex modern society. The Framers 
vested the legislative power exclusively in a collective Congress to create 
a legitimate mechanism for ascertaining the general good and resolving 
conflicting interests in the enactment of laws. Whatever the other virtues 
of executive branch agencies, they can never replicate the collective and 
representative Congress. The “administrative constitution” may improve 
accountability and restraint, but it does not therefore follow that
wholesale lawmaking by agencies fits into the Constitution. The 
Constitution carefully creates and protects the collective and exclusive 
nature of the legislative power by vesting it in Congress. The legitimacy 
of our system of government and the security and liberty of individuals 
depends on the people’s representatives in Congress exercising the 
legislative power.
                                                                                                                     
369. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1250 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that “[t]oday, the Court has abandoned all pretense of 
enforcing a qualitative distinction between legislative and executive power” and explaining that 
the “intelligible principle” test “does not keep executive ‘lawmaking’ within the bounds of 
inherent executive discretion”); see also VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 1 (“Although there is still a 
sense in which law is constitutive of the administrative state, that is so only in a thin sense—the 
way a picture frame can be constitutive of the picture yet otherwise unimportant, compared to the 
rich content at the center.”).
370. See supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 291–93 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 347–52 and accompanying text.
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